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This study will attempt to descriptively and analytically examine
the American foreign policy doctrine of counter-insurgency in the con
text of its emergence and development during the Vietnam war. Accordingly,
this will entail an examination of the conceptual origins of counter-
insurgency, its theoretical and substantive components, and the various
attempts to operationalize the doctrine from the Kennedy to the Nixon
administrations. Importantly, it should be emphasized that this work
is not a historical review or examination of the American military
role in Vietnam, but seeks only to microscopically focus on the mili
tarily and politically significant "concept" of counter-insurgency.
This concept is one which presents itself as an isolated yet integral
aspect of that war.
In respect to the guiding framework of analysis this basic position
of this paper is as follows. In light of the Third World's strategic
economic importance to the United States and the International Capitalist
System, it is vitally important for the United States that status quo
regimes favorable to its interest (i.e., continued economic domination
and exploitation) remain in power. In this context the violent outbreaks
of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and revolutionary nationalism
in the post World War II era represented a serious challenge to the
United States and International Capitalists System's continued domination
of the Third World. Accordingly, American military, strategic and
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political officials found it necessary to replace French military
aggression in Vietnam with the specific purpose of developing a military
strategy capable of defeating what they viewed as the new powerful
weapon of not only the Communist and Vietnamese revolutionaries, but
other poor, oppressed peoples of the Third World—namely, "guerilla
warfare." In the course of that intervention the United States has
devised a new kind of military strategy and warfare characterized as
counter-insurgency. The explicit function of counter-insurgency being
to challenge all outbreaks of violent revolutionary nationalism by
those peoples who have resorted to guerrilla warfare as their means
of achieving national liberation.
In regards to the organizational structure of this study, it will
consist of three main chapters. Chapter Two will entail an examination
of the conceptual origins of the counter-insurgency doctrine. In doing
so it will focus on the subtle and underlying factors which provided
the initial impetus for the necessary emergence and development of
the concept of counter-insurgency. This chapter puts into focus the
role of counter-insurgency warfare in the context of United States
global military and politicial policies.
Chapter Three will make a more substantive examination of the
counter-surgency doctrine in respect to its operational implementation.
This entails a review of the various tactical attempts to operationalize
the doctrine as far as its policy makeup and revisions are concerned.
Moreover, this chapter will call attention to the three Presidents;
Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon's unique tactical handling of the doctrine
and strategy.
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Next, Chapter Four will shift to a more detailed examination of
the actual technical operations of military warfare and strategy.
In that theories and policies interact with the operational tools used
to carry them out, this chapter will examine that relationship between
counter-insurgency strategy and its tactical weaponry. As such, this
will necessarily focus on the changes in military tactics and the
subsequent revisions range from manpower to geophysical to mechanized
and electronic warfare. The final chapter of this work will simply
be a summary and conclusion.
As a final note, we should add that this study will be carried
out in and with the use of library resources and materials. Primary
and secondary resources will be used with particular emphasis on those
of key personalities and official governmental agencies and documents.
The data used will range from historical to the contemporary and will




VIETNAM IN WORLD POLITICS:
EMERGENCE OF A CONCEPT
Neither ideas nor actions are conceived and manifested within
a vacuum of meaningless significance. Essentially, they are conscious
conceptions and responses to particular problems and concerns within
a more fundamental context or situation. More specifically, the broad
contextual or situational needs of problems provide the fundamental
nexus in which particular methodological tactics are utilized or
conceived. The importance of understanding the contextual or situa
tional basis of events and ideas is critical to this study of counter-
insurgency in Vietnam. For we can only understand these developments
if we have a clear perception of the context in which they were mani
fested. In reference to the Vietnam war then, it becomes quite appro
priate to ask, why counter-insurgency in Vietnam? What underlying
factors, conditions, needs or more broadly asked, in what context
or what were the situational concerns that led the United States to
embark on its military adventure in Vietnam?
In answering that question we must first graphically reconstruct
and reconceptualize the context of the events and issues which reflect
American foreign policy makers' preception of Vietnam and consequent
decision to become involved. In doing so, I would like to use a
three-tiered contextual framework which should facilitate any under
standing of how the "concept" of counter-insurgency emerges as the
guiding doctrine of American military policy in Vietnam. The first
part of this contextual framework focuses on U. S. policy officials'
broad view of the world. In other words, it reflects on the events
of worldwide significance which effected, necessitated and influenced
the development of the counter-insurgency concept. Secondly, we would
like to refine this broad world context and focus on those events
of regional significance within Indochina. Finally, the third part
of the contextual framework refines itself further to a look at events
inside Vietnam. The interconnection of these three contextual analyses
should then provide us with an understanding of "why" the United States
became involves in what has come to be known as the Vietnam War.
From the standpoint of a world context, American policy officials"
perception of Vietnam was related to events of global significance.
More specifically, this concern for global events was reflective of
foreign policy makers' constant post World War Two concern with the
cold war. Through the prism of the cold war paradigm every major
event was viewed in the context of the United States world policeman's
role as the chief stalwart against international communism. In the
immediate post World War Two era, Europe was considered to be the
chief battleground of the cold war. Hence, the United States concen
trated the bulk of its resources and attention to that part of the
world. To everyone's surprise, however, major events and crises else
where in the world soon refocused the center of attention. Significantly,
it was the anti-colonial, nationalist struggles of the so-called Third
World on the continents of Africa, Asia and South America that caught
the attention of the world. A series of small scale outbreaks of
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violence throughout the Third World were evidence of growing challenge
to American and European economic and political domination and exploi
tation. Former colonial empires were under attack and major changes
were in the making. American security officials perceiving those
events in the context of the cold war, generally explained the upheavals
as a part of what they saw as an attempt at global expansion by communist
nations, especially the Soviet Union. Moreover, they felt that these
general conditions of instability and unrest provided ideal conditions
for communist manipulation. In reference to Asia and the Vietnam
arenas, this concern is explicitly noted in the Pentagon Papers, saying:
The process of devolution from colonial empires to
independent states, it was thought, would create power
vacuums and conditions of instability which would make Asia
susceptible to becoming a battleground in the growing
East-West cold war conflict.
Yet while U. S. officials were extremely concerned about these
assumed attempts at communist expansion, an integrally related and
much more fundamental concern was the result of such changes. The
critical concern being that any such ideological transformation
would probably have serious negative effects for American interests
in those nations. And despite U. S. propaganda expressing concern
for the welfare of these peoples living under communist systems, a
much more realistic assessment of U. S. concern centers on its desire
to safeguard its interest. Economic interest, of course, being at
the heart of the matter.
Importantly, these economic interests which American foreign
U.S. Department of Defense. U.S. Vietnam Relations,
1945-1967. 12 Vols., Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing
Office, 1971, Books 1-2, p. A.45, II.A.3.
policy officials concern themselves with, must not be looked upon
as a short-term profit operations but more generally as an integral
part of the American capitalist system's inherent makeup. In the
first instance, as William A. Williams has aptly illustrated in his
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The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, the perenial driving force behind
United States foreign policy since 1776 has been the need to have
access to free-trade open markets for America's surplus production.
Therefore, viewed in the context of the cold war, the United States
perceived the violence in the Third World as part of the much feared
global communist expansion. Thus there was the fear that if any of
these nations were to become communist, as such, this would
automatically limit the ability of the United States to penetrate
and have access to these nations' markets and resources for trade and
investment purposes. Relatedly, a very important and similar point
is explained and expressed by Noam Chomsky in his At War With Asia
where he writes:
Consider, for example, how the threat of Communism
to the American system is defined in an extensive
study sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Foundation and
the National Planning Association, a study that
involved a representative segment of that largely
determines foreign policy, whoever is technically
in office. The primary threat of Communism, as they
see it, is the economic transformation fo the Communist
powers "in ways which reduce their willingness and
ability to complement the industrial economies of
the West." Correspondingly, the American crusade
against Communism is not a campaign against all forms
of development, but only against the effort of
indigineous movements to extricate their societies
from the integrated world system dominated largely
by American capital and to sue their resources for
their own social and economic development.
"william A. Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy
(New York: William Morrow Press, 1972).
Noam Chomsky, At War With Asia (New York: Pantheon Books,
1969) pp. 4-5.
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This ever-present desire for foreign markets is only half the
issue, the other half being a vital need and dependence for certain
necessary raw material resources. As evidenced by a Pentagon stock
piling program of strategic and critical raw materials (necessary
for military and domestic production) we find that "eighty to 100
percent of the supply needed by this country of more than half of
the strategic materials must be obtained abroad; for 52 of the 62
materials on the Pentagon list, at least 40percnet has to be secured
abroad." A Senate committee also concluded in 1954 that the United
States' inability to have access to these nations "to a very dangerous
extent, the vital security of this nation would be in serious jeopardy."
Even more crucial if viewed in the context of the post World War Two
turmoil, a Presidential commission noted that "three-quarters of the
materials imported under the stock-pile program came from underdeveloped
(Third World) countries." Moreover, the chairman of the commission
concluded: ". . . it is to these countries that we must look for
the bulk of any possible increase in these supplies. The loss of
any of these materials through aggression, would be the equivalent
4
Michael Klare, War Without End: American Planning for
the Next Vietnams (New York: Random House, 1972) p. 10.
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, Accessibility of Strategic and Critical Materials
to the United States in Time of War and for our Expanding
Economy, Report July 9, 1954, cited by Klare, Ibid., p. 11.
In reference to these committee hearings, it is interesting
to note the date—1954, the year of the French defeat and
the same year the United States began to replace France in
Vietnam.
of a grave military setback."6 Putting these points and the violence
of the Third World into proper perspective, Michael Klare notes;
"No more graphic presentation of the strategic significance
of the Third World to the American economy and way of life
can be made (in that) these minerals can be obtained only
in countries experiencing the seething turmoil born of ^7
nationalism and the struggle against economic stagnation.
In sum, we can generally ascribe the United States' involvement
in Vietnam to the fact the American policy officials preceived events
in Vietnam within the broad context of post World War Two Third World
upheavals and turmoil. More specifically, the context of that turmoil
refines itself as that perception extends to also view the developments
as part of the cold war, seeing the violence as communist inspired
in an assumed quest for global expansion. As we have tried to briefly
illustrate, American interest in these events was not based on abstract
notions in respect to a communist takeover, but more on a rabid fear
of the possible consequences for American economic interests.
It is within the context of this post World War Two trend that
Vietnam as one of a number of these violent upheavals acquires its
initial significance for American foreign policy officials. Yet its
importance increased as these officials examined Vietnam's own internal
events within the context of wider Asian regional developments. Oddly
enough, American officials early perceptions of Vietnam's turmoil
was simply that of a nationalist anti-colonial struggle. Here they
6U S International Development Advisory Board. Partners in
Progress (Washington, D.C., March 1951), cited by Pierre Jalee, Imperialism
in the Seventies (New York: The Third Press, 1972) p. 208. For more
information on this point also see Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialims;
The Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Monthly Review Press,
1969) pp. 45-54.
7Klare, War Without End, p. 11-12.
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saw a persistent and valiant Vietnamese people continuing their
historical struggles against various forms of foreign aggression.
Usually against the ancient Chinese dynasties but now in the post
World War Two era against Japanese and French colonialism. President
Roosevelt in particular was incensed at the French desire to maintain
its colonial empire in Asis and had often spoke of establishing some
type of international mandate system in those areas. Ironically,
then, in the 1940's it was the United States through the offices of
its Office of Strategic Services (OSS) that actually offered material
assistance along with personal and technical training to the Viet-
Minh forces. Moreover, it was Time magazine in 1945 that praised
venerable Ho Chi Minn by calling him the "George Washington" of Vietnam.
These initial perceptions faded soon as U. S. officials drasti
cally revised their views of both the turmoil in Vietnam and through
out Asia. Two major events stand out foremost in influencing that
transformation. One being the Chinese communist victory in 1949,
and the other being the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950. With
these developments the cold war paradigm was quickly extended to Asia.
Communism was now seen as the threatening menace to the entire area
with the Vietnamese conflict now being viewed through the same prism.
Chester Cooper, long time U. S. diplomat and specialist in Asian
affairs with first hand experience in the area, succintly notes official
policy perception transformation in respect to these regional develop
ments. We quote somewhat extensively his views on these events.
g
On the Chinese Communist victory he writes:
8Chester Cooper, The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam (Greenwich,
Conn.: Fawcett Premier Books, 1970) pp. 85-88.
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With Mao Tse-Tung's victory and the Chinese Communist
forces deployed along the northern borders of Laos
and Vietnam, Washington stirred out of its lethargy.
The war between the French and the Viet Minn had taken
on an entirely new character—it became an integral
part of the struggle between the "Free World and
"International Communism/ (emphasis added.)
Also,
In January 1950, China, quickly followed by the
Soviet Union, recognized the government of the
Ho Chi Minh. If anything else had been needed
to remove the French-Viet Minh war from the
T^jid ranks of a Colonialist-Nationalist struggle
into the elevated states of a confrontation between
the Free Wold and the Communist Bloc, this was it.
(emphasis added.)
And, furthermore on the Korean conflict,
The outbreak of the Korean war on June 25, 1950,
gave further respectabiilty to American assistance
to the French efforts against the Viet Minh. With
the Viet Minh now overtly supported by Moscow and
Peking, the fighting in Indochina was transformed
from a seedy, backwater colonialist-nationalist
struggle to a major international contest between
the Free World and Communist idealogies. (emphasis added.)
These two developments, the Chinese victory and the Korean war,
established the general conditions for American involvement, albeit
limited, into the affairs of Indochina. More important than this
limited involvement, however, these developments led to the enunication
of that infamous post World War II stalwart of U. S. foreign policy-
-the Domino theory. Set forth and elaborated primarily by the then
Secretary of State Dulles, the theory created an atmosphere in which
all Indochinese developments were now viewed as vital to the security
interests of the United States. Formulating this new principle Dulles
commented:
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If they (the Soviets) could get this peninsula
of Indochina, Siam, Burma, Malaya, they would have what
is called the rice bowl of Asia . . . And you can see
that if the Soviet Union had control of the rice bowl
of Asia that would be another weapon which would
tend to expand their control into Japan and into
India . . .
Later ths Domino theory was further elaborated and given full credence
in a National Security Council statement of policy on "U. S. objectives
and Courses of Action in Southeast Asia." In part, it stated:
1. Communist domination, by whatever means, of all
Southeast Asia would seriously endanger in the
short term, and critically endanger in the longer
term, United States security interests.
a. In the conflict in Indochina, the Communist
and non-Communist worlds clearly confront
one another on the field of battle. The
loss of the struggle in Indochina, in
addition to its impact in Southeast Asia
in South Asia, would therefore have the most
serious repercussions on U. S. and free world
interests in Europe and elsewhere.
b. Such is the interrelation of the countries of
the area that effective counteraction would be
immediately necessary to prevent the loss of
any single country from leading to submission
to or an alignment with communism by the remaining
countries of Southeast Asia and Indonesia.
Furthermore, in the event all of Southeast
Asia falls under communism, an alignment with
communism of India, and in the longer term, of
the Middle East (with the probable exceptions
of at least Pakistan and Turkey) could follow
progressively . . •
c. Communist control of all of Southeast Asia and
Indonesia would threaten the U. S. position in
the Pacific offshore island and would seriously
jeopardize fundamental. S. security interests
in the Far East . . .
9Cited in Cooper, Ibid., p. 90.




The effect of such a theory was in practice the extension of the Truman
Doctrine (previously used to fight Communists in Greece) to the Indochina
arena, thereby rationalizing and giving "justifiable" support to American
involvement and later direct intervention. President Eisenhower, who
uncritically accepted and gave full support to this thesis, proceeded
to provide substantial monetary and technical assistance to French forces
engaging the Viet Minh in Indochina.
Although one can easily agree that U. S. officials now regarded
communism as being a threat in regards to the Indochina area, this does
not wholly satisfy or explain why the U. S. became so directly involved
with such intensity and expense. As partly justified and explained in
the above analysis, the more general right-wing assumption has suggested
that the United States was only attempting to prevent the spread of inter
national communism. And on the left, we have had varying assumptions,
with the more popular being that the United States was merely acting
out its imperialist character and was seeking certain economic gains
within Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia.
Yet, both the assumptions, in my view, tend to obscure the analysis
and reflect too simplistic notions about the inertia of nations, (especi
ally capitalist) and the motives of their foreign policies. The right-
wing diatribe about stopping communism merely describes the superficial
aspects of America's anti-communist policy without any substantive treat
ment of the subtle underlying motives , needs and consequences of such
policies. As far as the left is concerned, it is true that certain
specific economic interests were in mind and regarded as significant
to U. S. security officials. For instance, notice remarks in the above
mentioned National Security Council memorandum's assessment of U. S.
interest in Southeast Asia:
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The loss of Southeast Asia would have serious
economic consequences for many nations of the free
world and conversely would add significant resources
to the Soviet bloc. Southeast Asia, especially
Malaya and Indonesia, is the principal world source
of natural rubber and tin, and producer of petro
leum and other strategically important commodities.
The rice exports of Burma, Indochina and Thailand
are critically important to Malaya, Ceylon and Hong
Kong and are of considerable significance to Japan
and India, all important areas of free Asia. Fur
thermore, this area has important potential as a
market for the industrialized countries of the free
world, (emphasis added.) ^
As evidenced by these comments real economic concerns were there.
Yet to ascribe the undertaking of a major foreign policy to these speci
fic economic interests is to unfairly and unnecessarily place limitations
on the theory of imperialism. Instead, it inversely professes a kind of
blind economic determinism as a guide to the national interest of an im
perialist power. This obscures rather than aptly applying the notion
of imperialism. In the context of Vietnam an analysis of imperialist mo
tives, in respect to national security and vital interests, must have a
broader application. Therefore, a more appropriate analysis of imperi
alism emerges if viewed from the standpoint of what Arnold Wolfers calls
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"milieu goals"; that is, favorable conditions in the international en
vironment, including balances of power and spheres of influence, which
then become new national values requiring protection themselves.
11 U.S.-Vietnam Relations. Ibid., p. 221.
12 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: The John
Hopkins Press, 1962).
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Cited in Robert Osgood, The Weary and the Wary: U.S.-Japanese
Security Policies in Transition (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1972)
p. 36.
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Hence the United States' involvement in Vietnam must be looked at
in a broader sense as expressed by Wolfers and as implied earlier in this
chapter in those remarks stressing the necessity of examining the Indochina
war from a global standpoint or context. Note that the point made earlier
in the chapter concerning the United States' need for certain raw mate
rials and desires for foreign markets is substantiated and borne out —
in a global context, in the remarks underscored in the above National Secu
rity memorandum.
In light of this need for a broader or more total picture, it is
necessary to extend the context of our world and regional analysis by
connecting it specifically to developments inside Vietnam and to those
figures personally responsible for the direct United States involvement.
In connecting our world view with specific events inside Vietnam, a very
significant picture emerges. As emphasized earlier, the turmoil and up
heaval within Vietnam was a common occurrence throughout the Third World
in the Post World War Two era. The critical feature of this turmoil,
however, was the unique nature of pattern of violence. Explaining the
uniqueness of these upheavals Richard Barnett comments:
Since World War II the continents of Asia, Africa
and South America have been continually swept with vio
lence . . . Much of the political violence that has
influenced human society since 1945, however, has been
of a special character. Its source has not been con
flict between states, but conflict within societies
... Essentially, contemporary wars have been fights
for the rights of various political groups within the
former colonial appendages of Europe to take political
power and to exercise it on their own terms . . . These
have been colonial wars against a European power or wars
against a domestic ruling class or elite. In each case
they are fought for a local political purpose. They are
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struggles of new states to decide what they shall be and
most Importantly, who will run them. They take the form
of civil wars but they are really revolutions . . . The
goal is a radical redistribution of political and econo
mic power to overcome contrivances of political oppres
sion and crushing poverty . . . *■*
As mentioned earlier, U.S. officials viewed these developments with great
concern believing that they provided either fertile ground for communist
infiltration and manipulation, or were the direct results of communist
subversion. But more important than just the general assumption that the
turmoil was the result of attempted communist expansion, the primary con
cern with the violence of the Third World was its particular form. Atten
tion now focused on what was viewed as a "new form of Soviet aggression".
Namely, it was known as national liberation war or guerrilla warfare along
with a number of other names such as limited war, subterrenean war, brush-
fire wars, etc. In essence this type of warfare was viewed as a tactical
tool used by communist agitators. A primary influence in aiding the de
velopment of this perception was the very important and widely read speech15
by Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschev in 1961. On such types of wars he
said:
Now a word about national liberation wars . . .
can such wars occur in the future? They can . . . but
these wars are popular uprisings. In other words, can
conditions be created in which people lose their patience
and rise in arms? They can. What is the attitude of the
Marxists towards such uprisings? A most positive one
. . . The Communist fully support such just wars and
14 Richard Barnett, Intervention and Revolution; America's Confrontation
with Insurgent Movements Around the World (New York: Meridian Books,
1968) p. 3, 4, and 5.
A speech so important in fact that Congressional hearings were
held on that speech alone. See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee to Inves
tigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act, Analysis of the
Khruschev Speech of January 6, 1961. Hearings, before a subcommittee on
the Judiciary, Senate, 87th Congress, 1st Session, June 16, 1951.
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march in the front ranks with the people waging libera
tion struggles.16
With this pronouncement U. S. officials were convinced that the violence
in the Third World was the product of Communist agitation and interference.
Hence, every major trouble spot was viewed with serious concern. And this
was no small matter indeed in that former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
pointed out that "there have occurred in the last decade over 149 serious
internal insurgences". With such a large number of potential revolu
tionary developments in the making, the United States indeed was greatly
concerned about the ability of oppressed peoples to resort to and effec
tively engage in wars of national liberation.
Despite being aware of these assumed developments, U.S. policy offi
cials were unsure as to what would be the most appropriate response.
Since World War II and particularly under the Eisenhower administration,
the United States had concentrated its military build-up efforts under
the doctrine of "massive retaliation". Under this doctrine the United
States had been preparing for World War III with the belief that its ap
propriate response would be the threat of or actual use of nuclear repri
sal to any necessary challenge. In essence, then, while the United States
was well prepared to fight another general type of war, i.e., World War
III, it was totally unprepared to deal with the small-scale irregular wars
taking place throughout the Third World.
See Andrew Kauffman, "On Wars of National Liberation", Military
Review (Oct., 1968), p. 32; also see Walter Jacobs, "Soviet Views of Wars
of National Liberation", Military Review (Oct., 1967) and Frank Trager,
"Wars of National Liberation: Implications for U.S. Policy and Planning",
Orbis (Vol. XVIII, Spring 1974, No. 1).
Barnett, Intervention, p. 4; also Jacobs, Ibid., p. 36.
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As a response to this problem, many American military strategists
began to criticize the excessive emphasis on massive retaliation and now
called for new proposals to deal with these so-called limited or low-inten
sity conflicts. One of the first was Lt. Joseph P. Kruger, who wrote:
During the "no war, no peace" situation of the pre
sent, conspiratorial and unconventional techniques have
played the major rather than the minor role. The spora
dic flare-ups of various types of irregular warfare and
the almost continuous condition of guerrilla warfare in
parts of Africa, the Near East, and the Far East would
appear to emphasize a need for us to re-examine our war
plans and strategic doctrine.18
In addition, another writer, Edward Downey, Jr., stressed the need for
incorporating guerrilla warfare itself within the U.S. strategic military
doctrine. He wrote:
The United States must develop a guerrilla poten
tial as quickly as possible, based on the best available
information and experience . . . Naturally the first
step should be an exhaustive study of guerrilla warfare
... we must create a sound theory for a resistance move
ment ... we must glean every lesson from existing guer
rilla literature. More than this, we must search out exis
ting guerrilla leaders who have not published their exper
iences. Full development of any theory awaits upon this
accumulation of knowledge.^
Aside from these suggestions, by far the most publicized and influen
tial criticism came from General Maxwell Taylor who set forth his views
in a widely heralded book entitled The Uncertain Trumphet. On this sub
ject Taylor wrote:^°
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Lt. Joseph P. Kruger, "Irregular Warfare in Transition", Military
Affairs (Fall 1960), p. 115.
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Edward F. Downey, "Theory of Guerrilla Warfare", Military Review
(May, 1959), p. 54, cited in Kruger, Ibid.. p. 116. One should note that
Downey's emphasis on gathering information may have influenced President
Kennedy who at the start of his administration likewise stressed such
activities.
20
Gen. Maxwell Taylor, The Uncertain Trumphet (New York: Harper and
Brothers Publishers, 1960) pp. 5-6.
19
It is my belief that Massive Retaliation as a guid
ing strategic concept has reached a dead end and that there
is an urgent need for a reappraisal of our strategic needs.
In its heyday, Massive Retaliation could offer our leaders
only two choices, the initiation of general nuclear war or
compromise and retreat. From its earliest days, many world
events have occurred which cast doubt on its validity and
exposed its fallacious character. Korea, a limited conven
tional war, fought by the United States, when we had an
atomic monopoly, was clear proof of its universal efficacy.
The many other limited wars which have occurred since 1945
— the Chinese Civil War, the guerrilla warfare in Greece
and Malaya, Vietnam, Taiwan, Hungary, the Middle East,
Laos, to mention only a few — are clear evidence that,
while our massive retaliatory strategy may have prevented
the Great War — a World War III — it has not maintained
the Little Peace; that is, peace from disturbances which
are little only with the disaster of general war.
As an alternative, Taylor suggested a new policy which eventually trans
formed the entire strategy of the U.S. military:
The strategic doctrine which I would propose to re
place Massive Retaliation is called herein the Strategy
of Flexible Response. This name suggests the need for a
capability to react across the entire spectrum of possi
ble challenge, for coping with anything from general
atomic war to infiltration and aggression such as threa
tened Laos and Berlin in 1959. The new strategy would
recognize that it is just as necessary to deter or win
quickly a limited war as to deter general war . . .
In that Vietnam was now attracting greater and more serious attention,
many officials felt that it was the appropriate place to give Taylor's
suggested strategy a try.
Out of this growing desire for a new military strategy, then, we
began to witness the emergence of the doctrine and concept of "Counter-
insurgency". But one man, more than General Taylor was chiefly respon
sible for providing a sustained impetus and substantial support for this
new concept. That man was President John F. Kennedy. It is here in the
context of this flexible response strategy that we find President Kennedy's
great personal role and interest in the Vietnam conflict. As a matter
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of fact, as early as 1956 Kennedy had recognized the importance of Vietnam
in a global context. Basically synonomous with the accepted domino theory,
Kennedy speaking to a group known as "American Friends to Vietnam" said:
Vietnam represents the cornerstone of the Free World
in Southeast Asia, the keystone in the arch, the finger
in the dike. Burma, Thailand, India, Japan, the Philli-
pines and obviously Laos and Cambodia are among those
whose security would be threatened if the red tide of
Communism overflowed into Vietnam . . . The fundamental
tenets of this nation's foreign policy, in short, depend
in considerable measure upon a strong and free Vietnamese
nation ... Vietnam represents a test of American res
ponsibility and determination in Asia.21
In addition, Kennedy also clearly recognized the general post World War
II trend of events as far as the prevalence and potential of guerrilla
wars in effecting fundamental political and economic changes in the world.
In a special message to Congress on the Defense budget, he expressed the
view that "non-nuclear wars, and sub-limited or guerrilla warfare, have
since 1945 constituted the most active and constant threat to Free World
security".22 Moreover, Kennedy also recognized the fact that it was with
in the Third World underdeveloped nations where these wars would take
place. On this point he noted: "The great battleground for the defense
and expansion of freedom today is the whole southern half of the globe
— Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East — the land of the
rising peoples".
21 U.S.-Vietnam Relations. Books 1-2, II.A.3. pp. 31-32.
U.S.-Vietnam Relations. Book 7, p.c-7. (emphasis added).
23
John F. Kennedy, Public Papers of the President (U.S. Govt. Printing
Office: Wash., D.C.) Special Message to Congress, May 25, 1961. (emphasis
added).
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In essence, Kennedy exhibited a keen understanding of the general
thrust of world history in this era. Oppressed peoples throughout the
Third World, the life blood-line of U.S. world imperialism, were mounting
an increasingly powerful and widespread resistance movement. Kennedy,
however, like most U.S. policy officials, recognized this trend but only
in the context of the cold war. Hence, they saw dominoes falling as the
result of a global Communist conspiracy. And because the American con
ception of the cold war was that of a zero sum game — a win for the Com
munist was a loss for the West — Kennedy felt that the United States had
to become involved. Kennedy, moreover, even had a personal stake in de
terring or defeating these national liberation wars. Having witnessed
the loss of Cuba through revolutionary warfare and its subsequent align
ment with the Soviet Union, he felt that the United States had to make
a show of force to prove to the Soviet leadership (particularly Khruschev)
that the United States would not buckle under pressures from Moscow.
Kennedy, then, in order to stifle the rising revolutionary movements through
out the world felt that the United States must have the capacity to pre
vent such developments.
Accordingly, Kennedy was most receptive to General Taylor's notion
of a "flexible response". In fact, Kennedy publicly reiterated the stra
tegy as expressed by Taylor. On the limited utility of massive retaliation,
he said:
But both before and after 1953 events have demon
strated that our nuclear retaliatory power is not enough.
It cannot deter Communist aggression which is too limited
to justify atomic war. It cannot protect uncommitted na
tions against a Communist takeover using local or guer
rilla forces. It cannot be used in so-called brushfire
peripheral ways.
22
And, on the necessity of a flexible response strategy,
We must regain the ability to intervene effectively
and swiftly in any limited war anywhere in the world —
augmenting, modernizing and providing increased mobility
and versatility for the conventional forces of the Army
and Marine Corps.^
Further evidence of Kennedy's acceptance of this new strategy was reflec
ted in his decision to appoint Taylor as his principal military adviser
and his later promotion to the chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Yet, Kennedy was concerned with providing a creative response to the par
ticular kind of warfare taking place inside Vietnam. Kennedy wanted a
strategy of "counter-insurgency" developed as a tactical "flexible res
ponse" to what had come to be known as "revolutionary guerrilla war or
national liberation wars". Kennedy expressed this view in a classic re
mark on this new concept of counter-insurgency in a speech to a graduating
class at West Point:
Korea has not been the only battleground since the
end of the Second World War. Men have fought and died
in the Malaya and Greece, in the Phillipines, in Algeria
and Cuba and Cyprus, and almost continuously on the Indo-
Chinese Peninsula . . . This is another type of war, new
in its intensity, ancient in its origins — war by guer
rillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush
instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggres
sion, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy
instead of engaging him. It is a form of warfare uniquely
adapted to what has been strangely called "wars of libera
tion", . . . It requires ... a whole new kind of stra
tegy, a wholly different kind of force and therefore, a
wholly different kind of military training, (emphasis
added.)"
24 U.S.-Vietnam Relations. Book 7, p. C-5.
25 Public Papers, Kennedy. June 5, 1962, p. 453 & 454.
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This statement by Kennedy set the basic framework in which he wanted a
counter-insurgency strategy developed. Eight days after the Bay of Pigs
fiasco he again stressed the necessity of such a strategy as he ordered
a Task Force to Vietnam for its development. Here he said:
... we dare not fail to see the insidious nature
of this new and deeper struggle. We dare not fail to
grasp the new concepts, the new tools, the new sense
of urgency we will need to combat it — whether in Cuba
or South Vietnam. 26
And so, Vietnam was to be the arena or "testing ground" for new mili
tary strategy. As Noam Chomsky has reflected on this point,
Vietnam then provided an opportunity to prove to
Peking and Moscow that their policy of "wars of libera
tion" was dangerous and uncompromising and also provided
both a challenge and opportunity to test the new doc
trines of counter-insurgency.2'
This notion of testing ground was later explicitly revealed in National
Security Memorandum 288 (March, 1964) which noted that throughout the world
"the South Vietnam conflict is regarded as a "test case" of U.S. capacity
0 ft
to help a nation meet the Communist "war of liberation . . ." For, as
viewed by U.S. officials, they felt that in view of world events at that
time, "faced with a challenge to deal with wars of national liberation,
it would be hard to decide that the first one we happened to meet was 'not
our style1."
26 U.S.-Vietnam Relations, Books 1-2, IV, B p. 22.
2' Noam Chomsky, For Reasons of State (New York: Pantheon Books,
1971), p. 43.
28 Cited in Chomsky, Ibid., p. 44.
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In sum and in general, we can now answer the question of "why the
U.S. became involved in Vietnam?" Essentially, it represented a test case
and a battleground between so-called communist wars of national liberation
and the U.S. military doctrine of counter-insurgency. Vietnam would be
the chessboard and the Vietnamese peoples the pawns as the United States
attempted to stifle a dynamic social revolution and in the process check
what they viewed as another attempt at global communist expansion. More
over, however, Vietnam provided the United States with the opportunity
to test and develop its new military strategy of counter-insurgency, which
they hoped could be used to deter other revolutionary wars of national
liberation throughout the underdeveloped and exploited nations of the
Third World. And so the doctrine of counter-insurgency emerges as some
thing more than just a military strategy, it is much more, a global foreign
policy. A foreign policy designed for the purpose of maintaining the inter





After having established the basic framework which led to the United
States1 involvement in Vietnam, we would now like to go further and make
a more substantive examination of the counter-insurgency doctrine in re
spect to its operational implementation. This will entail a review of
various tactical attempts to operationalize the doctrine as far as its
policy make-up and revisions are concerned. Moreover, this chapter will
examine the attempt to develop and operationalize a counter-insurgency
strategy as handled by the three Presidents, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon.
As explained in Chapter One, it was President Kennedy who provided
the initial impetus and substantive support for a counter-insurgency stra
tegy. It was he who set all the wheels in motion for the development of
such a doctrine. Having read all of the works of Mao Tse-Tung and Che
Guevara, Kennedy soon requested that all persons involved in strategic-
military concerns do the same. As Chester Cooper points out, "Counter-
Insurgency was the 'New Thing1, and everybody who wished to be somebody
in Washington scrambled to get on the bandwagon".1 All concerned offi
cials began to fervently read the works of Mao and Che and other infor
mation on guerrilla warfare. Furthermore, President Kennedy established
1 Chester Cooper, The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam (Greenwich,
Conn.: Fawcett Premier Books, 1970) p. 217.
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a high-level interdepartmental staff called the "Special Group for Counter-
Insurgency".2 This group, headed by General Taylor, with Robert Kennedy
as the President's personal representative, was to coordinate all activi
ties of the various agencies and personnel working on the development
of a counter-insurgency strategy.
In addition, a number of actions were taken on the military front.
First of all, President Kennedy ordered an upgrading and increase in the
Special Forces training program at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. As Roger
Hilsman explains,
He wanted the Special Forces, who were to be experts
both in guerrilla and counterguerrilla warfare, to be an
elite corps, and over the objection of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff he directed that they were to wear the green beret
as a symbol of their elite status.
In response to this Special Forces buildup, the Navy and Air Force each
created its own counter-insurgency units — the Sea/Air/Land teams (SEAL'S)
and Special Operations Forces (SOF), respectively. Furthermore, specific
measures were taken to upgrade the general capabilities of regular mili
tary troops. Army troops were raised from 870,000 to 1,000,000 while
the Navy added 29,000 and the Air Force gained 63,000. Moreover, about
two billion dollars was appropriated for the development and purchasing
2
See Lt. Col. William Buchanan and Lt. Col. Robert Hyatt, "Counter-
Insurgency Political Structure", Military Review (Vol. XLVIII, Sept.,
1968, No. 9); also see Lt. Col. Gustav Gillert, "Composition and Organiza
tion of the Special Group for Counter-Insurgency", Military Review (Vol.
XLV, No. 4, April, 1965).
3 Roger Hilsman, To Move A Nation (New York: Doubleday, 1967), p.
415.
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of non-nuclear (i.e., counter-insurgency or limited war) weapons and equip
ment. Clearly, as Richard Walton has noted, "the great buildup in conven
tional war-making capacity, his (Kennedy's) passion for the Green Beret,
the counter-insurgency program — all these make sense only as a prepa
ration for counter-revolution".^
Sensing a need for concrete action, Kennedy sent Vice President Lyndon
Johnson to Vietnam in 1961 to see how the United States could be of more
specific assistance. On his return, Johnson gave the following report:
We must decide to help the countries to the best of
our ability or throw in the towel in the area and pull
back our defenses to San Francisco and a "Fortress America"
concept. More important, we would say to the world in this
case that we don't live up to our treaties and don't stand
by our friends. This is not my concept. I recommend that
we move forward promptly with a major effort to help these
countries defend themselves.5
While the remarks foreshadowed Johnson's later actions, they were not con
sistent with Kennedy's conception of what form the counter-insurgency
effort should take. Consequently, Kennedy rejected such actions. Des
pite the rejection, however, Johnson's report signaled an increasingly
serious situation and it did pressure Kennedy to back up what he felt were
previous commitments.
Accordingly, Kennedy responded in two significant ways. One, he
increased the number of advisers (600 when he became President) beyond
the 645 man limited stipulated by the Geneva Convention. Moreover, he
4 Richard Walton, Cold War and Counter-revolution (New York; Viking
Press, 1972), p. 166 (emphasis added).
5 Quoted in Walton, Ibid.. p. 170.
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sent 400 Special Forces troops to Vietnam along with the following
instructions:
1. Dispatch . . . agents to North Vietnam for intelli
gence gathering.
2. Infiltrate teams under light civilian cover to south
east Laos to locate and attack Vietnamese Communist
bases and lines of communications.
3. In North Vietnam, using the foundation established by
intelligence operations, form networks of resistance,
cover bases and teams for sabotage and light harrass-
ment.
4. Conduct over flights for dropping of leaflets to
harrass the Communists and to maintain morale of North
Vietnam's population and increase gray broadcast to
North Vietnam for same purposes.
5. Train the South Vietnamese Army to conduct ranger raids
and similar military actions in North Vietnam as might
prove necessary or appropriate.
These actions by Kennedy constituted the first concrete commitments to
what was to become a long, gruesome fiasco in Vietnam. Yet despite the
significance of these actions, they were not part of any clear-cut, com
prehensive program of counter-insurgency. Realizing the necessity and
urgency to be more programmatic in his approach, Kennedy ordered another
mission to Vietnam. The purpose of the mission was to supplement the
counter-insurgency plans being developed in the United States, in order
that a more coherent, well planned program of action could be instituted.
This mission was carried out by General Taylor and Walt Rostov (two
of Kennedy's key advisers) along with a team of specialists from various
governmental agencies. After spending a few weeks in Vietnam, the Taylor-
Rostow mission — in conjunction with the work done by the Pentagon,
6 Quoted in Walton, Ibid., pp. 169 and 170.
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State Department and Fort Bragg military schools — came up with a set
of policy recommendations which would constitute a broad framework for
the counter-insurgency strategy.7
These policy recommendations, known as the "strategic concept", spe
cified a combination of military, political, economic and social measures.
The first set of recommendations called for a series of governmental and
administrative reforms by the Diem government. The second set asked that
the United States provide the necessary material aid and technical advi
sers required. This aid would focus on economic reforms at the village
level, supplemented by civic, police, social and political action. By
implementing the measures, the counter-insurgents hoped to gain the sup
port of the populace and later organize political parties/programs as
a basis for Western-oriented modernization. In addition, the United States
would furnish military arms and equipment for village self-defense corps
along with specialized equipment for the South Vietnamese military to free
them from a static defense and provide the mobility to carry out search
and destroy missions. This aspect of the program was to include helicopter
pilots, mechanics, and other specialized technicians who would implement
training programs for the South Vietnamese. Finally, special types of
weaponry suited to the ecological conditions in Vietnam were also recom
mended.
These set of recommendations were quickly approved by President Ken
nedy thereby establishing the basic "strategic concept" of counter-insurgency.
^ These recommendations are found in Hilsman, To Move A Nation, pp.
422 and 423.
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Significantly, however, there had been a third set of recommendations
which Kennedy disapproved. That is, General Taylor had specifically called
for the immediate introduction of ten thousand American troops with the
possibility of more increases later. This proposal was very much in ac
cord with Vice President Johnson's earlier remarks. Yet, Kennedy contin
ued to reject this type of action as he felt they did not constitute an
effective counter-insurgency program. In this context, he said:
Without the support of the native population there
is no hope for success in any of the countries in South
east Asia: try to oppose Communist advancement apart
from and in defiance of innately nationalistic aims spells
foredoomed failure.
In summing up, we see that the strategic concept of counter-insur
gency was a threefold program:8 (1) separating, protecting and winning
the support of the population; (2) developing military and paramilitary
counter-guerrilla capabilities, and (3) applying the political, economic,
and social measures that are necessary to convert military successes into
political gains.
Before going into the operationalization of the strategic concepts,
I think it will be useful to examine the basic conceptual framework in
which the counter-insurgency strategy was developed. This conceptual
framework is divided into two parts: I. Basic Underlying Assumptions,
and II. Operational Methods.
I. Basic Underlying Assumptions. The first part of this conceptual
framework deals with a number of broad guiding assumptions underlying
8 Hilsman, Ibid., p. 451
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the counter-insurgency effort. Importantly, all of these assumptions
are somewhat interrelated, one either growing out of the other or supple
menting it. Generally, we can distinguish four basic assumptions.9
(1) The most basic assumption was that the Vietnam conflict was
merely an extension of the cold war between communism and the western
capitalist world. The conflict was not seen as arising out of local con
ditions, but rather that it was a new communist (i.e., Soviet Union and
China) attempt at global expansion. And because the American conception
of the cold war was that of a zero sum game — a win for the Communists
was a loss for the West — the United States felt that it had to inter
vene. In this context, Michael Klare explains, "... South Vietnam was
a new revolutionary front in what Kennedy and his advisers considered
Free World territory — and thus could not fall into Communist hand."
In assessing this cold war mentality of Kennedy, Richard Walton comments:
"... Kennedy demonstrated deep and dangerous misunderstanding of the
postwar world. He confused revolution in countries where revolution was
inevitable with communist conspiracy".11 Most important, however, is
that while this cold war mentality may in part be one of basic ignorance
and misunderstanding, it also serves a very useful purpose for American
imperialism. As Mr. Ahmed notes,
9 Some of these assumptions were noted earlier in Chapter One. Here
we would like to re-emphasize those points as they relate to the develop
ment of the counter-insurgency strategy while adding more information
on the assumptions.
10 Michael T. Klare, War Without End: American Planning for the
Next Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1972) p. 49.
11 Walton, Cold War, p. 164.
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The association of revolutionary guerrilla warfare
and radical nationalism with Communism helps justify U.S.
involvement in a wide range of counter-revolutionary ope
rations from Ethiopia to Uruguay (the former against non-
Marxist Eritrean Nationalists, the latter against the
Tuparnaros, a group of anti-communist party, unorthodox
radicals).12
(2) A second and related assumption to the communist conspiracy theory
was the belief that the guerrillas in South Vietnam were externally trained,
armed, supported and controlled from the outside — primarily from Hanoi.
Consequently, much of the literature on counter-insurgency was based on
the thesis that the war was caused by "aggression from the North" through
the sending of infiltrators into the South. It was for this that Kennedy's
first orders directed the Green Berets to carry out special missions inside
North Vietnam. Later United States intelligence sources revealed the com
plete inaccuracy of this assumption. This blunder, then, not only revealed
the counter-insurgents' weak assessment of the Vietnamese revolution,
it also illustrated their total lack of understanding about revolutions
and guerrilla warfare. If they had read Mao and Che correctly, they would
have understood that self-reliance and independent control are most funda
mental to those engaged in revolutionary war. But, as with the first as
sumption, the second also serves a useful purpose for the U.S. imperialist.
For if the liberal reactionaries of the Kennedy administration admitted
that the revolution in Vietnam was an indigenous and popular war, it would
undermine the entire counter-insurgency effort.
(3) The third and perhaps most fundamental assumption was that revo
lutionary guerrilla warfare was merely a new communist technique which
** Eqbal Ahmed, "Revolutionary War and Counter-Insurgency", Journal
of International Affairs (Vol. XXV, No. 1, 1971) p. 22.
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had to be answered with a better technical solution. All analysis toward
a solution was focused on technical problems as opposed to any attempt
to understand the substantive causes of guerrilla warfare. Consequently,
the American counter-insurgents stressed the necessity of devising and
creating counter techniques to meet the new challenge. Hence you have
Kennedy's fervent emphasis on new strategies and tactics (i.e., Special
Forces, psychological warfare, pacification schemes, etc.) and his admi
ration for the Green Berets who were symbolic of these new techniques.
In this context, then counter-insurgents view so-called communist tech
niques such as land reform, health care, education, etc., as being oppo
rtunistic tools rather than genuine answers to local grievances. Also,
it is for this reason that "the military writings of Mao are reproduced
and cited out of their political context, their specific local character
is ignored", notes Mr. Ahmed, "and he is presented as a systems-builder
rather than the leader of a historical revolution."13
(4) A final assumption, growing out of the emphasis on a technical
solution, was that of considering Vietnam as a testing ground. Vietnam
was viewed as the testing ground for what they saw as the new weapons
of the cold war-counter-insurgency vs. guerrilla warfare. The counter-
insurgents of the Kennedy administration felt that since the communists
had instituted this new technique, Vietnam would be the battleground
to challenge the tactic and settle the issue. This notion is indicated
in a well-publicized statement by one of the chief counter-insurgents,
13 Ahmed, Ibid.» p. 30.
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Walt Rostow:
if we have the common will to hold together and
get on with the job — the struggle in Vietnam might be
the last great confrontation of the post war era . . .If
the Cuban missile crisis was the Gettysburg of the cold war,
Vietnam could be the wilderness; for indeed, the cold war
has been a kind of global civic conflict. Vietnam could be
the closing of one chapter in modern history and the opening
of another.14
In 1963 General Taylor also provided some remarks which not only
attest to the use of Vietnam in devising a counter-insurgency strategy,
but also indicates the second way in which it was used as a test, namely
the development of new counter-insurgency weapons and technology.
Speaking before a Congressional committee in 1963, he said:
Here we have going a laboratory where we see subver
sive insurgency, the Ho Chi Minh doctrine, being applied
in all its forms. This has been a challenge not just for
the armed services, but for several of the agencies of
government, as many of them are involved in one way or
another in South Vietnam. On the military side, however,
we have recognized the importance of the area as a labo-
•^Srv. We have had teams out there looking at the equip
ment requirements of this kind of guerrilla warfare . . .
Six years later General Westmoreland updated and verified Taylor's state
ment in comments he made on the value of the Vietnam laboratory:
The devices coming out of there are "revolutionizing"
the techniques of warfare; having inflicted in Vietnam
over two-thirds of enemy casualties, long-range warfare
and air power have proved their capacity to rain destruc
tion on the battlefield within minutes . . . whether
friendly troops are present or not; with the new electro
nic devices the enemy could be mechanically located,
tracked and targeted; and that technology would permit
a tremendous economy of man power.
14 Quoted in Ahmed, Ibid., p. 19.
15 Quoted in Klare, War Without End, p. 49.
16 Quoted in Ahmed, "Revolutionary War", p. 21.
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Finally, out of this assumption concerning techniques, you have the
development of the "domino theory". American strategists were vehemently
claiming that the United States must squash this new communist technique
in Vietnam, otherwise its use would be attempted throughout the world.
II. Operational Methods. The operational methods constitute the
basic overall range of approaches or plans to be utilized in developing
a complete counter-insurgency program. The different categories are by
no means mutually exclusive, as one or more methods can be integrated
while each may receive greater or lesser emphasis depending on specific
conditions and who is heading the war effort. Generally there are three
basic approaches:
(1) The first approach places emphasis on political, economic and
social development. Recognizing the supremacy of the political character
of guerrilla warfare, it attempted to provide or restore some measure
of "political" legitimacy to the crumbling South Vietnamese government.
For this reason, psychological warfare or pacification programs (designed
to win the hearts and minds of the people) supplemented by rural develop
ment and economic assistance schemes are implemented. In addition, the
counter-insurgents found it necessary to institute a "system of resources
control in the villages (i.e., restraints on the movement of people and
goods in and out of the guerrilla zone) in order to undermine the insur
gents* administrative infrastructure".17 In essence, this approach is
geared toward "modernization" in the framework of western liberal democracy.
17 Klare, War Without End, p. 47.
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Consequently, its literature is saturated with terms such as freedom,
democracy, reform, free-choice, progress, development, etc.
(2) The second approach emphasizes the use of the local indigenous
population in carrying out the counter-insurgency program. While these
troops would do the actual fighting, the United States was to provide
material and economic support along with the necessary specialized ir
regular training. This approach appeased Kennedy's desire not to commit
large numbers of American troops, for as he well knew, it would be impos
sible for foreigners to claim they were fighting for national liberation
as were the guerrillas. Furthermore, it would reduce the use and inevi
table loss of American manpower.
More specifically, this mercenary approach was carried out in three
ways. First of all, the Green Berets, CIA and other intelligence agencies
trained Montagnard and Meo minority tribes in South Vietnam as specialized
mercenary forces. The second method was the general training and support
of the regular South Vietnamese army by American advisers. A final sec
tion of the plan called for the training of local police forces to be
used in the cities, villages and strategic hamlets.
The entire approach rested on the belief that the United States
would confine its activities to that of an assistance and advisory capa
city. While it was felt that Americans might be used in some initial
operations — such as helicopter and jet pilots, it was assumed that
these tasks would eventually be taken over by the South Vietnamese.
(3) The third and final approach emphasizes the full exploitation
of the United States1 superior technology and resources. In a general
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sense, its aim was to provide maximum mobility and firepower necessare
for a "now you see, now you don't" type guerrilla warfare. In the early
stages of the war, then, there was great admiration for helicopters and
supersonic jets. Later, out of this emphasis on technology, there were
calls for the use of sensors and detection devices designed to locate
the guerrillas. Finally, this approach led to the development of com
pletely electronic or automated battlefield systems requiring limited
manpower. More details on this topic will be discussed in the next chapter.
At this point let us examine President Kennedy's attempt to opera-
tionalize the strategic concept. As mentioned earlier, the Taylor-Rostow
mission combined with the work done by military strategists in the United
States provided the basic guidelines for a counter-insurgency program.
Yet, no specific operational plans had been devised to implement the stra
tegic concept. The solution to this problem was eventually worked out
by a man named Sir Robert Thompson, head of the British Advisory Mission
to Vietnam. Thompson, a career officer in the British colonial service,
had spear-headed the British counter-insurgency program in Malaya.
Thus, because of that program's so-called success, Thompson was acknow-
18
ledged as one of the world's foremost experts on counter-insurgency. °
The key to Thompson's plan was what had come to be known as the "stra
tegic hamlet". He was proposing the adoption and refinement of a special
1 Q
x Thompson's highly acclaimed counter-insurgency work, based on
his experiences in Malaya, is Defeating Communist Insurgency (New York:
Praeger, 1966).
19 Also see Major William Smith, "Strategic Hamlets in Vietnam",
Military Review (Vol. XLIV, No. 5, May, 1964).
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village program which the British had used In Malaya. Thompson explained
that the plan was essentially political, saying that pure military efforts,
as the British found in Malaya, would not solve the problem. As Roger
Eilsman notes,
Thompson pointed out that the Viet Cong's main effort
was not in fighting the regular troops — they could have
done much more of that than they were actually doing —
but in attempting to gain administrative control over the
sixteen thousand hamlets of South Vietnam.20
The Viet Cong's efforts, then, were essentially of a political nature.
They strove to organize and gain the support of the population. Their
struggle depended primarily on the amount of support given by the pea
santry. As Mao had pointed out, "the peasants were the sea in which
the guerrillas swam". Consequently, Thompson's plan suggested the cut
ting off of the guerrillas from their base of support, the peasants,
who he believed were being forced into assisting the Viet Cong.
To be more specific, Thompson's plans were broken down into two major
areas: physical security or protection; and reform and development.
In the first phase, Thompson suggested that a series of strategic hamlets
be established in the Delta region of Vietnam extending from the sea
to the mountains and jungle. Each hamlet was to be situated in close
defensive proximity to other hamlets so that together, they would con
stitute a broadly connected zone of security. Each of the respective
hamlets would then be surrounded by barbed wire and a moat. Afterwards
the peasants would be moved (or forced) into these hamlets so as to
20 Hilsman, To Move A Nation, p. 430.
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provide them with "protection" from the Viet Cong. Once in the hamlets,
a strict security program would be established to control the flow of
goods and people. This aspect of the plan would entail the issuing of
identification cards and setting up curfews and checkpoints maintained
by local police forces. At some point, the people would be armed for
their self-defense and protection, while other military and paramilitary
forces would be used to reinforce security and maintain communications
between all the hamlets. The key to the entire protection phase of the
plan was to eliminate the guerrilla infrastructure within the hamlet.
Thompson notes,
Until this is done, no hamlet will be secure against
repenetration and treachery, nor can the people themselves
be expected to take positive action on behalf of the gov
ernment until insurgents' agents and supporters within the
hamlet are removed.*1
This point is significant in that the protection phase was designed to
provide the peasants with opportunity to make a "free choice" as to whom
they would support — the government or the Viet Cong.
In the effort to assist the peasants in their "free choice", the
second phase of Thompson's program — reform and development — follows.
Thompson felt that government had to prevent the peasants from supporting
the guerrillas by offering them positive and concrete benefits. The
reform and development phase, then, was to be a combination of economic,
political, social and cultural benefits. Thompson, who characterizes
this as the "winning" stage of the operation, called on civic action
Thompson, Communist Insurgency, p. 124.
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teams to implement the following measures:
. . . the provision of schools, medical clinics, mar
kets, land reform, improved agricultural methods and cre
dits, running water supplies, electricity, radio programmes,
newspapers and improved communications (so that there is
constant contact with the outside world), followed by local
elections to village councils and national elections to a
national legislature.22
Accordingly, these measures would necessitate widespread reforms by the
Diem government. If implemented, the government would then be providing
basic services to areas where none, other than tax collection, had pre
viously existed.
In essence, Thompson's plan, like the Viet Cong's, was essentially
a political one. It sought to isolate the guerrillas, just as the guer
rillas sought to isolate the government, for this was the key to victory.
As Thompson pointed out, these actions would take years of slow, pains
taking work, but once this turning point was reached, and once the majo
rity of the population had decided to support the local Vietnamese, the
struggle against the supportless guerrillas could be won.
Overall, Thompson's plan was well received in the Kennedy adminis
tration's counter-insurgency network. Note Roger Hilsman's, one of the
Administration's top strategists, comments on this subject:
It seemed to Ambassador Notting and others in the
U.S. Embassy that Thompson's ideas made a great deal of
sense — as they certainly did to me when I heard it
from Thompson himself. And his recommendations jibed
completely with results we had been conducting in the
Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Depart
ment.23
22 Thompson, Ibid., p. 125.
23 Hilsman, To Move A Nation, p. 433.
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As Hilsman further explained, they saw two significant military advan
tages with the plan: (1) By isolating the people, the strategic hamlet
would deprive the guerrillas of their main source of strength, food and
recruits; and (2) Being cut off from this support, they felt that the
guerrillas would then have to come out of the mountains and jungles,
and be forced to fight on the government's terms. In this context, Hilsman
adds:
It seemed more and more possible that an effective
strategic concept could be developed by combining Thomp
son's strategic hamlet plan with the work in Washington
and Fort Bragg on both the military tactics to be pursued
and the measures to combat the strains of modernization
• • •
In this way, the United States proceeded to provide the operational
military task to complement the Thompson plan. Generally there were
OK
five military tasks which the South Vietnamese were to carry out:
(1) The first was a static defense — this entailed the guarding
of bridges, power plants, communication centers, armament supplies and
other strategic installations necessary for the government's operation.
(2) The second task constituted the heart of the strategic hamlet
military program. It consisted of "clear and bold" operations •— pushing
the Viet Cong out of an area and holding them off until the hamlets were
capable of defending themselves.
(3) The third task would be the setting up of partly mobile forces
who would act as reinforcements to hamlet self-defense units.
24 Hilsman, Ibid., p. 435.
25 Hilsman, Ibid., pp. 435 and 436.
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(4) The fourth task would be the establishment of completely mo
bile forces who constantly attack the guerrillas in order to prevent
them from massing large concentrations of troops. Importantly, however,
these were not to be large seek and destroy operations — for most govern
ment troops would be used in the first three tasks. Only in the late
stages of the program when the hamlets developed a stable security zone
would such operations be undertaken.
(5) The fifth and final task would be the adoption of almost pure
guerrilla tactics. Units of the South Vietnamese Special Forces, acting
like guerrillas, were to lay ambushes, plan raids and generally maintain
a constant harrassment of the Viet Cong.
These military tasks combined with Thompson's plan, then, charac
terize the main attempt by the United States to operate its strategic
concept of counter-insurgency. Yet, despite the seemingly well-organized
nature of the plans, the American counter-insurgency did not go well.
So, after about a year and a half of operations, a report was sent to
President Kennedy explaining the major problems in operationalizing the
plans.
In brief, the report made the following assessments and conclusions:
(1) the South Vietnamese Army relied too much on large-scale operations
and conventional tactics. In addition, there was an excessive use of
air power and chemical defoliants; (2) concerning the hamlets themselves -
their establishment had been shabby and totally uncoordinated; and (3)
there had been a total neglect of the necessary political, economic and
social reforms. Overall, there was a lack of administrative coordination
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exacerbated by an excessive emphasis on military matters.
In early 1963, Michael Forrestal and Roger Hilsman went on a spe
cial mission for the President and confirmed the previous report while
adding:26
There is no overall planning effort that effectively
ties together the civilian and military effort; (2) There
is no long-range thinking about the kind of country that
should come out of a victory; (3) Among both civilians and
military (American and Vietnamese) there is still some con
fusion over the way to conduct a counter-guerrilla war; and
(4) In general, the United States should use all of the le
verage it could to persuade Diem to adopt the suggested
policies.
In examining the counter-insurgents' assessment of their problems,
one can see that they continued to view the war as being a case of mana
gerial and technical manipulations. Interestingly enough, while this
bureaucratic-managerial assessment may in part be a case of ignorance,
it also comforts the counter-insurgents in their refusal to accept the
genuine sincerity of the Vietnamese revolution. Consequently, it is
from this standpoint that one must judge the weaknesses and failures
of the counter-insurgency program. For while it is true that the han
dling of the counter-insurgency program resulted in many of the problems,
a more fundamental cause was that they were challenging an inevitable,
well-organized, and popular revolution. In this context, no amount of
managerial techniques and manipulations could stifle the determination
and sincerity of the Vietnamese people.
26 Hilsman, Ibid., pp. 451 and 452.
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Faced with the problems, however, President Kennedy was forced to
commit more and more American troops. At the time of his death there
were a little over 16,000 advisers and troops in Vietnam. Yet, in spite
of this growing American war by proxy, Kennedy seemingly remained committed,
in principle, to his original counter-insurgency strategy. He hoped
that the American troops could hold off the Viet Cong until the South
Vietnamese were prepared to carry on the counter-insurgency program.
In this context, note Hilsman's personal assessment of Kennedy's strategy
after the President's death:
No one, of course, can know for sure what President
Kennedy would have done in the future had he lived. But
his policy had been to keep the fighting as limited as
possible, to urge the new government to pursue an effec
tive counter-guerrilla program designed to protect the
people and win their allegiance ... In any event, Pre
sident Kennedy made it abundantly clear to me on more
than one occasion that what he wanted most to avoid was
turning Vietnam into an American war . . ,2^
After Kennedy's assassination the American counter-insurgency effort
began to undergo serious changes. Lyndon Johnson, who was now President,
and, as indicated in his earlier report to Kennedy, favored a much more
forceful and conventional approach to the war. Moreover, there was rising
pressure from the Pentagon and other military officials for a more full-
scale attack in the war. Significantly, however, Johnson and these mili
tary officials believed quite strongly in the notion that the war was
a result of an external (communist) source of aggression. This was indi
cated in two key statements by Johnson. He states;
27 Hilsman, Ibid., pp. 536 and 537.
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It became increasingly clear that Ho Chi Minh's military
campaign against South Vietnam was a part of a larger^much more
ambitious strategy being conducted by the Communists.
And more specifically,
Thus what we saw taking shape rapidly was a Djakarta-Hanoi-
Peking-Pyongyang axis, with Cambodia probably to be brought in
as a junior partner and Laos to be merely absorbed by the NOrth
Vietnamese and Chinese
Acting in such a framework, the Johnson policy was designed to
deter what was belived to be "inflitration and aggression" from the
North. Johnson, then, did not share Kennedy's perception of certain
internal dynamics of the war in the South. As a result, in 1964 Johnson
began what was to later become a massive bombing campaign. Interestingly
enough, much of the bombing was concentrated not only in South Vietnam
where the actual fighting was taking place, but also in North Vietnam.
Despite the new bombing policy, the situation continued to worsen
in South Vietnam. Faced with the possibility of almost total collapse,
Johnson decided to introduce — as a matter of formal policy — large
number of American troops. This decision was made on July 28, 1965,
with the following statement:
I have asked the commanding general, General
Westmoreland, what more he needs to meet this mounting
aggression. He has reported to me the need for more
troops. We will meet his needs. I have today ordered to
Vietnam the Air Mobile Division and certain other forces which
will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 almost.
28
Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency
1963-1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1974) p. 134.
29
Johnson, Ibid., p. 136.
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immediately. Additional forces will be needed later, and
they will be sent as requested.'0
True to his word, Johnson introduced more and more troops until the number
passed the 500,000 level. The large number of troops complemented by
an intensive bombing campaign committed the United States to a major war
effort in Vietnam. While many of the technical strategies and programs
of the Kennedy era remained and were retried on a larger and more brutal
scale, Johnson did not share the previous President's ideas favoring
a sophisticated, meticulous, political counter-insurgency effort. Johnson
saw himself as a man of forceful action and in his view a vigorous and
tough military campaign was the strategy through which the war could be
won. True to his beliefs that was his course of action. A course of
action so military oriented in fact, that the Viet Cong and North Viet
namese accurately characterized the Johnson strategy as the "Burn All,
Destroy All, Kill All" policy.31 In this context it was clear that the
strategy of counter-insurgency as elaborated by the Kennedy administra
tion had been drastically altered, if not totally abandoned.
Despite Johnson's decision to turn the Vietnam conflict into an
American war, the United States was unable to defeat the so-called "insur
gents". More important, the war began to have some serious negative
consequences for the United States. First of all, the war was becoming
too costly as it began to seriously affect the business economy, leading
to the dual pressures of inflation and recession. Its monetary cost
30 Johnson, Ibid., p. 153.
31 See U.S. Imperialists; Burn All. Destroy All. Kill All Policy
in South Vietnam (South Vietnam: Giai Phong (Liberation) Editions, 1967),
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was rising to thirty billion dollars a year.32 Furthermore, this cost
was compounded by the increasing loss in American manpower. By 1968
casualties were up from over 100 killed in action a week to over 500.
Moreover, the moral isolation and condemnation of the United States became
more vigorous not only throughout the world, but even more so within
the American society as anti-war sentiments heightened.
In the context of these growing pressures we have President Nixon's
handling of the war. In general, the Nixon doctrine abandoned the re
vised massive involvement policy of Johnson and returned more closely
to Kennedy's original counter-insurgency strategy. This revision of
the Johnson massive involvement policy, however, is primarily in respect
to a visible American presence. Nixon like Johnson had no hesitation
about the massive use of force. Essentially, this was accomplished in
two ways: (1) the initiation of what was called the policy of "vietnami-
zation"; and (2) an increased use of air power in addition to a reliance
on mechanized and technological warfare. The details of this technolo
gical and mechanized warfare will be discussed in Chapter Four.
The policy of vietnamization was established as an integral part
of the Nixon doctrine in 1969. In reference to Vietnam the following
guidelines were put forth:
In deterring subtheater or localized warfare (i.e.,
conflict which does not involve the U.S. directly with
either the U.S.S.R. or the People's Republic of China),
32 Sir Robert Thompson, No Exit From Vietnam (New York: McKay Co.,
1969) p. 61.
33 Thompson, No Exit From Vietnam, Ibid., p. 61.
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the country or ally which is threatened bears the prima
ry burden, particularly for providing manpower, but when
U.S. interest or obligations are at stake, we must be
prepared to provide help as appropriate.34
Interestingly, once again, we find that its chief architect was Sir Robert
Thompson. The main purpose of the policy — called a "long haul, low
cost" strategy by Thompson — was to eliminate the overt and intensive
opposition to the war in the United States. As Mr. Ahmed explains it:
"Making a war domestically acceptable thus involves turning it into a
forgotten war ... by relegating it to the back pages of the newspaper
and by keeping it at a maximum distance from cameras". Moreover, this
task would entail a reduction and eventual elimination of the U.S. troop
presence in Vietnam. Thompson explains:
In this way the whole cost of the war, in every sense,
could be reduced to a level which would be acceptable to
the majority in the United States, without proving to be an
excessive drain on her manpower or emotions. '
A second aspect of the strategy of vietnamization called for the
formal re-emphasis or return to the pacification schemes (strategic ham
lets, etc.) of the Kennedy era. More specifically the measures included:
inducing the Saigon regime to act in accordance with the law; improving
civil and military administration; defining the control governments and
Melvin Laird, The Nixon Doctrine (Wash., D.C.: American Enter
prise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972) p. 11.
3* Thompson's analysis and suggestions for President Nixon are ex
plained in his No Exit From Vietnam.
36 Ahmed, "Revolutionary War", p. 16.
Thompson, No Exit From Vietnam, p. 199.
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villages' responsibilities and obligations; selecting priority areas
for pacification and mounting seek and destroy operations in areas out
side the selecting ring. Thompson in particular, called for these mea
sures, with the belief or rationalization that they were never properly
implemented before.
Significantly, in conjunction with vietnamization, there was ano
ther side of the Nixon strategy which placed maximum emphasis on tech
nological warfare. As a matter of fact, it was the United States abi
lity to introduce what was known as an "automated or electronic battle
field" that not only aided vietnamization, but actually made it possible.
As a result of years of experimental testing which took place in Vietnam,
the United States had advanced its technology to the point where it sought
to conduct warfare with less and less manpower. Major General Ellis
W. Williamson explained these developments in congressional hearings
saying:
We are making unusual efforts to avoid having the
American young man stand toe-to-toe, eyeball-to-eyeball,
or even rifle-to-rifle against an enemy that may out
number him on the battlefield. We are trying to fight
the enemy with our bullets instead of the bodies of our
young men — firepower not manpower.'"
This automation of war fitted quite nicely into Nixon's strategy geared
toward a reduction of American ground troops. In this way Nixon's counter-
insurgency strategy would be mainly that of a supportive role, unlike
JO U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Investigation
into Electronic Battlefield Program, Hearings, before an Electronic Battle
field Subcommittee, Senate, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, November, 1970,
p. 69.
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Kennedy's, however, because Instead of limited troops and advisers there
would be American technology.
While the details of this new kind of warfare will be discussed in
Chapter Four, we should mention here that the corrollary of this advanced
machine technology — air power — was also used quite vigorously by
Nixon. Surpassing even the massive bombing campaign of Johnson, Nixon
used conventional air technology to the maximum extent as a means of
supplanting the reduction of American troops. Thus, during the Nixon
phase of the war emphasis began to shift to air operations. The result
and significance of this change is noted by Fred Branfman who writes:
As of May 1, 1972, Air Force and Navy airmen (55-
60,000) outnumber U.S. ground forces (53,000) for the
first time. This is THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY THAT A
SUPER POWER HAS DEPLOYED MORE AIRMEN THAN FOOT SOLDIERS
TO FIGHT ABROAD.39
Moreover, the effect of this increase meant that it was under the Nixon
administration that the majority of bombs were dropped on Indochina.^
The total bomb tonnage dropped being over 3.2 million tons since 1969.
Breaking this tonnage down into further statistics it comes out to: (1)
more than three million pounds a day; (2) more than 2,000 pounds or a
ton a minute; and (3) at a cost of seven million dollars per day.41
In conclusion, as we assess the American counter-insurgency stra
tegy in Vietnam, one could say — that because it was based on a number
39 Fred Branfman, "The Era of the Blue Machine Laos: 1969",
Indochina Chronicle (No. 6 & 7, Oct. 15, 1971) p. 1.
40 Air War: The Third Indochina War (Washington, D.C.: Indochina
Resource Center, 1972) p. 5.
41 Air War. Ibid., p. 5.
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of erroneous assumptions, complemented by the imperialist nature of the
United States in general — the American officials never truly understood
the dynamics of the social revolution in Vietnam. Consequently, their
bureaucratic-managerial technical manipulations never addressed themselves
to the real problems and causes of the Vietnamese revolution. As a re
sult, the counter-insurgents stumbled endlessly and painfully on a course
devoid of political reality. Yet it was precisely this abberation of
political reality that led American officials to devise new strategies,
tactics and weapons culminating in the development of a complete counter-
insurgency doctrine. A counter-insurgency doctrine, it should be added,
designed to challenge all outbreaks of violent revolutionary nationalism




As noted in the previous chapter, the final phase of the American
efforts in the war began to shift toward the increased use of advanced
machine technology as the primary form of U.S. involvement. Significantly,
as noted also in Chapter Two under the section regarding "basic under
lying assumptions", we cited certain evidence which indicated that the
search for new technological weaponry specifically suited for wars such
as the guerrilla conflict in Vietnam was one of the key American goals.
This search and testing of new weapons complements my earlier assertions
made in Chapter One, that United States strategists saw Vietnam as a test
ing ground for the development of strategies capable of defeating these
guerrilla or national liberation wars.
Accordingly, the purpose of the chapter is to tie in the dialectical
interaction of the American military doctrine of counter-insurgency and
the operational technology (i.e., weaponry) developed to implement it.
While the weaponry developments were quite numerous and beyond my purpose
here, * do want to discuss three types of weapons which tend to delineate
For more information on the numerous and varied types of weapons
developed in and for Vietnam-like conflicts see Lt. General John Hay,
Jr., Tactical and Material Innovations (Washington, D.C.: Department of
the Army, 1974), and Eric Prokosch, The Simple Act of Murder: Anti-personnel
Weapons and Their Developers (Philadelphia: National Action/Research
on the Military Industrial Complex, 1972).
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or clearly reflect the emphasis on counter-insurgency as opposed to con
ventional warfare techniques. The three particular concepts of warfare
under consideration here are: (1) Environmental warfare-Ecological defo
liation; (2) Geophysical warfare-Weather modification; and (3) Technolo
gical warfare-automated battlefield.
In examining these new methods of warfare developed in Vietnam,
one notices the immediate relationship between the weapons and the over
all American counter-insurgency strategy. As would be expected, new
ideas (ideas about weapons in this case) evolve and development to fit
the appropriate conditions or environment under which they must be opera-
tionalized. Accordingly, we would first like to examine this idea of
ecological defoliation as being intrinsically connected with the American
counter-insurgency strategy. For it is in guerrilla war that ecological
advantages and tactics become extremely important.
In the first instance, for the guerrilla the ecological environment
becomes a vital necessity. It is his cover, sanctuary and haven. Facing
a technologically advanced, better equipped and larger enemy, the guer
rilla must learn to blend in with his natural environment as he fights
a hide and seek, appearing and disappearing war. Significantly, theorists
on guerrilla warfare denote two strategic environmental necessities for
the guerrilla. The first, his people — as Mao Tse-Tung put it, "The
people are the sea in which the guerrilla swims". This human environ
ment calls attention to the ability of a guerrilla to disguise himself
as an everyday civilian (which in a very real sense he is) outside of
the actual military conflict. The second, which is more of our concern
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here, is the natural plant environment. It is here under actual mili
tary conditions, that the guerrilla has a strategic weapon to move men
and materials without notice, to rest without harrassment and to strike
with awesome deception upon an unaware and foreign enemy.
On the other side of the line is the counter-insurgent (generally
a foreign invader) unfamiliar with the territory and terrain. For him,
the environment is no friend, it is a cold, dark, mysterious menace.
In this context, the American counter-insurgency strategist were logi
cally led to initiate and perpetuate a war not only upon the guerrillas
themselves, but also, perhaps his best ally — his natural, ecological
environment. Especially in Vietnam, which is largely a rural area with
thick forest, swamps, high fields and hilly mountainous terrain — the
National Liberation Front (NLF) or Viet Cong enjoyed a tremendous eco
logical advantage. Accordingly, in an attempt to destroy this protective
environment, the United States military pursued a "war against the land".2
The rationale of this counter-insurgency tactic was set forth at the
First Defoliation Conference in 1963. Explaining the concept, F. J. Del-
more commented:
The capability of destroying cover and concealment
to defend against and fight off guerrilla and other type
of tactics is absolutely essential. When we clear vege
tation from roadsides, railways and canals, we substan
tially reduce the opportunities for ambush, and thus
allow our own operations to proceed in a more timely man
ner. Defoliants would also be used to demarcate bounda-
2
Although this particular section concentrates on the direct eco
logical attack on nature, it should be borne in mind that this tactic
also affects the guerrilla's first natural ally — the peasants. More
on this will be forthcoming.
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rles. Defoliation could be used to clear gun emplace
ments, open up fields of fire, mark areas of bombing, or
test whether or not a particular area has camoflage or
actual vegetation.^
What we had developed in Vietnam, then, was a new concept in war
fare appropriately labelled "ecocide". While no clear cut definition
of the concept has been enunciated, we refer to it as the conscious and
persistent attempt to destroy or maim a natural ecological system.
The U.S. military actually began to use herbicides as a weapon of
war in 1961 under a program code named Operation Ranch Hand. Confined
mainly to South Vietnam, Operation Ranch Hand was a two-part program.
Its main objective "accounting for about 89 percent of all U.S. contem
porary aircraft sorties, was directed against the forest of South Vietnam
in an attempt to deny cover and sanctuary to the other side". In addi
tion, the second part of the operation was aimed at crop (mainly rice)
destruction in an attempt to deny the NLF a source of food. Before going
further it should be pointed out that both these tactics served a larger
purpose in the U.S. counter-insurgency strategy. Namely, it sought to
force the people into strategic hamlets thereby destroying the guerrillas'
support structure.
See John Lewallen, Ecology of Devastation; Indochina (Baltimore:
Penguin Books, Inc., 1971) p. 63.
Arthur Westing, "Herbicides in War: Current Status and Future
Doubt", Biological Conservation (Vol. 4, No. 5, Oct., 1972), p. 322.
It should be pointed out, that although this paper focuses on herbicidal
damage to the forest, it is by no means the only method used by the U.S.
Widespread saturation bombing, attempted firestorms and rome-plows were
other tactics of destruction.
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In looking at the attack on the forest of South Vietnam we can de
note six broad categories of forest types:5 (1) Dense forest (jungle);
(2) Open (clear); (3) Bamboo; (4) Mangrove; (5) Rubber; and (6) Other
(pine and brush). The main areas of concentrated chemical herbicide
attacks were the dense forest and mangrove. As an indication of the wide
spread nature of the U.S. program, however, one notices that almost no
areas were spared from becoming military targets. Accordingly, a 1967
Midwest Research Institute document noted the following areas as targets:
"Nipa-palm and Mangrove, upland forests, foliage around villages and mili
tary post, roadsides, the southern portion of the Demilitarized Zone,
swamps and canals in the Mekong delta and also the Sihanouk Trail in Sou
thern Laos". A more precise measure of the damage is determined by
the actual land areas which have been sprayed. Looking first at those
areas which came under concentrated attack — the dense upland forest
(jungle) — an estimated 32 percent of South Vietnam's 5.5 million hec
tares were sprayed; in addition to 25 percent of the total 0.5 million
hectares of mangrove lowland forest type.7 In other areas Arthur H.
Westing, who perhaps has done more research in this field than any other
single individual, estimates that from 1961 to 1971, a total of 2 million
hectares (4.9 million acres) out of 10 million hectares (24.7 million
Arthur Westing, "Ecological Effects of Military Defoliation on
the Forests of South Vietnam", Bio Science (Vol. 21, No. 17, Sept., 1971),
see Table p. 895.
Found in Lewallen, Ecology of, p. 65.
7 Westing, "Herbicides in War", p. 235.
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acres) have been sprayed one or more times. This representing roughly
20% of the total forest in South Vietnam. Westing admits that his esti
mate is conservative due in part to a dependence on the Department of
Defense (DOD) figures. In this context, the DOD figures suggest a total
of 22% for the total area sprayed from 1961-1969, while the NLF asserts
o
a total of 52%. Again, the disparity in figures is found in the per
centage of annual sprayings — the DOD suggesting 6% while the NLF sug
gests 9 to 10%. Whatever the actual extent of the forest sprayings,
the areas subjected are significant indicating the seriousness of the
counter-insurgents' views on ecological warfare. As one researcher
explained it, "The Vietnamese war is probably the most consistently fo
rest war of any recorded, at least in modern history".
Turning now to the crop destruction tactics of the ecological war,
one can sense the brutal and extremists lengths this American counter-
insurgency establishment was willing to go in its battle against the NLF.
The crop destruction or food denial program as it is called, is simply
a means of trying to starve the guerrillas into submission. Although
not as significant as the attacks on the forest, this aspect of the en
vironmental war also constituted an integral part of the American stra
tegy. It began quietly in the early 60's, but by 1968 its operations
were openly acknowledged.
Statistically speaking, the area sprayed was over 300 thousand
8 Westing, "Ecological Effects of", p. 893.
Q
See Westing, Ibid., Table p. 894.
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hectares or 8% of South Vietnam's total croplands. The main target of
these attacks was the upland rice in the Central Highlands. According
to Westing, "The total estimated destruction via this aspect of the U.S.
resource denial programme, for the years 1962-70, comes to 163 million
kilograms of milled rice". This figure does not include the amount
of rice destroyed which was found in rice stores in rural areas.
Overall, then, the U.S. counter-insurgency strategy was designed
to deny their guerrilla enemies both food and cover. Attacking forestry
and croplands, the United States sprayed and mutilated (many areas more
than once) over 12% of the total land in South Vietnam.
In carrying out these sprayings a number of herbicidal agents and
their mixtures were tested. * The most widely used and standard chemi
cal herbicide was a mixture of N-butyl esters of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T esters
commonly called Agent Orange. This agent was also used from time to
time in conjunction with Agent Purple (a different configuration of the
same esters).^ After 1966 another herbicide, Agent White — a mixture
of 2,4-D and Pilcoram — was also widely used. These three chemicals
are characterized as systematic herbicides which destroy plants by at
tacking their internal systems. Pilcoram in particular, the most active
herbicide known, kills a wide range of plants and remains active in the
soil many months after spraying. Looking at the amount of active
10 Westing, "Herbicides in War", p. 325.
11 S
ee Lewallen, Ecology of, Table p. 64.
12
Lewallen, Ibid.» p. 63.
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ingredients used on the ecological system in South Vietnam, we find a
"total of over 25 million kilograms (55 million lbs.) of 2,4-D, over
21 million kilograms (47 million lbs.) of 2,4,5-T and over 1.5 million
kilograms (3.3 million lbs.) of Pilcoram".13 Different from the above
agents — Agent Blue, a dessicant on contact herbicide was the chief
crop destruction defoliant used. A mixture of sodium dimethy larsenate
and dimethylarsinic (cacodylic) acid, this agent "injures foliage by
direct chemical action on contact, causing the leaves to turn brown,
curl, dry up and wither". ^ A total of 3 million kilograms of this Agent
Blue was used on crops.
This combined total of "86 million pounds" of herbicides were sprayed
mainly from specially equipped C-123 cargo planes. Over the years
these planes (later assisted by helicopters) flew more than 20,000 sor
ties. These sprayings had an almost immediate effect on the forests
and plants. Explaining the detailed effects of these herbicidal attacks
Westing comments:
When an upland forest is attacked with herbicide,
the leaves drop after two or three weeks and the trees
remain bare for several months. Sunlight, able to
reach the forest floor following defoliation promotes
the growth of a luxuriant understory in which certain
13 Westing, "Ecological Effect of", p. 895.
•*■* Found in Lewallen, Ecology of, p. 63.
15 Westing, "Herbicides in War", p. 322.
16 Arthur Westing, "Ecocide in Indochina", Natural History (Vol.
LXXX, No. 3, March, 1971), p. 58.
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herbaceous grasses and shrubby bamboos dominate . . .
when refoliation occurs, it turns out that at least
one out of every 8 or 10 trees has been killed by the
treatment, a situation presumably obtained in 1.5 mil
lion hectares (3.7 million acres). On the other hand,
for those one-half million additional hectares (1.2
million acres) that have been sprayed more than once,
the proportion of these killed rises dramatically —
apparently anywhere from 50% to 80% or even higher, de
pending upon the local mix of species and on the inter
val between sprayings.
In assessing the overall performance of this aspect of counter-in
surgency, one would have to say it met with dubious success or to be more
correct, it was simply a failure. Designed primarily to deny the NLF
its ecological advantage — the defoliation of the jungle forest allowed
for the subsequent growth of a thick underbrush of savannahs and bamboos
which provided as much or more cover than before. Moreover, the geno-
cidal crop destruction operation, it was found, had a more devastating
impact on the civilian population rather than on the NLF guerrillas.
This is particularly true as far as its effects on old people, women
and children were concerned. For the program only caused an increase
in hunger and starvation. So rather than winning the hearts and minds,
confidence and support of the people — and in the process isolate the
guerrillas — just the opposite was the case. This had to be the logical
outcome of such a policy, particularly in a nation like Vietnam, where
the people have a strong attachment to the land and love to see and reap
the benefits of their productive labor. By destroying their land and
crops, the counter-insurgency strategist lost vital support and confirmed
17 Westing, "Ecological Effects of", p. 896.
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the arguments of the NLF that the Americans were just another bunch of
destructive foreign invaders. As a substantiation of these claims. Westing
notes that herbicidal impact was not only ecological, for the food denial
program destroyed rice crops that were destined to supply the total diets
of 894,000 Vietnamese civilians for one full year.18 In addition, the
economic loss due to forest defoliation "amounts to roughly 47 million
m^ (6500 million bd. ft.) of merchantable timber plus an indeterminate
amount of fuel wood, charcoal and other secondary products — for an
19
approximate total cash value of 0.5 billion dollars".
In sum, the American strategy of counter-insurgency devised and im
plemented a new form of weaponry — environmental warfare (i.e., ecolo
gical defoliation) — based on the widespread and unprecedented use of
chemical herbicides. Wreaking havoc on a total ecological system, herbi
cidal warfare has and will have far-reaching human, animal and plant life
ramifications. Of course, due to the unprecedented use of herbicides
and the lack of information of the details of the operation, the full
effects, side effects of this type of warfare will not be known for some
20
time. Yet, despite the massive level of destruction, damage and misery
brought on by this ecological warfare, an end to its further use is not
in sight. For the American counter-insurgency strategy in many ways
18 Westing, "Herbicides in War", p. 322.
19 Westing, Ibid., p. 324.
What is known at this point, however, is that many areas of Viet
nam have been permanently maimed, while others will take years and even
decades to regenerate themselves.
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viewed Vietnam as a testing ground and consequently what was learned
there must now be refined. In this context, environmental warfare through
ecological defoliation seems to have found a permanent place as one
of the new counter-insurgency weapons useful in fighting guerrilla
wars. Aside from the continuation of this type of warfare by the South
Vietnamese army, Westing notes that "contingency plans have just been
21
revealed for their future U.S. military employment. John Lewallen
also comments: "There are indications, however, the Defense Department
is refining its herbicide program as a means of dealing with its problems
throughout the world." He cites a 1969 Air Force announcement that
it was seeking a contractor for its "ultimate goal" of a handbook for
Air Force civil engineers with world-wide recommendations for affecting
22
vegetation control. Accordingly, in future wars of national liberation
we can expect not only a war against the guerrillas, but also a "war
against the land."
At this point I would like to turn the discussion to another form
of warfare which is both relatively new in general and relatively unpublicized
as far as its use in Vietnam is concerned. That is geophysical warfare
or weather modification. More specifically, one type of counter-insurgency
warfare which was tested and used in Vietnam was that of manipulating
the rainfall. As I said, however, detailed information on the development
and use of this weapon is scarce. With that in mind, this section
will attempt to piece together the available information on the subject
21Westing, "Herbicides in War," p. 327.
Lewallen, Ecology of, p. 68.
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and in the process will hopefully shed some light on the actual operations
of this new weapon of war.
The first concrete indication that the use of weather modification
was being used as a form of warfare in Vietnam was in 1966. It was
at this time that one of the DOD top weather scientist Pierre Saint
Amand-who is head of the Earth and Planetary Sciences Division of
the Naval Ordinance Laboratory, Naval Weapons Center, California-speaking
before a Senate committee discussing weather modification comments:
"We regard the weather as a weapon. Anything one can use to get his
way is a weapon and the weather is as good as any."23 Yet Saint Amand's
statement went relatively unnoticed and attracted little attention.
In 1971 however, well-known syndicated columnist Jack Anderson revealed
that the United States had been using weather modification techniques
to stimulate rainfall over the Ho Chi Minn trail since 1967. In his
controversial March 18th Column Anderson wrote:
...The hush-hush project, known by the code name "Intermediary-
Compatroit," was started in 1967 to hamper enemy logistics.
Those who fly the rainmaking missions believe they
have increased the precipitation over the jungle roadways
during wet seasons. . . These assertedly have caused
flooding conditions along the trails, making them impassable.
The Ho Chi Minh trails will get their next monsoon
bath from May to September. . .Only those with top
security clearance know, until now^that nature would
be assisted by the U.S. Air Force.
23See Peter Caplan, "Weather Modification and War," Bulletin
of Concerned Asian Scholars (Vol. 6, No. 1 Jan-Mar. 1974) p. 30.
24Deborah Shapley, "Rainmaking: Rumored Use Over Laos Alarms
Arms Experts, Scientists," Science (Vol. 176, No. 4040, June 16, 1972),
p.1217.
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Soon after, and in addition to Anderson's startling column, the
most direct evidence so far was found in the Pentagon Papers. Here
it was revealed that the U. S. had previously, in 1966 conducted weather
modification experiments successfully over Laos. That section of the
Pentagon Papers read:
4 LAOS OPERATIONS—-Continue as to plus Operation
POP EYE to reduce trafficability along infiltration
routes. Authority Policy Changes—Authorization
required to implement operational phase of weather
modification process previously tested and evaluated
in same area. Risk/Impact—Normal milj|ary operational
risks. Risk of compromise is minimal.
In addition, there is another reference to a memo dated February 24,
1967 which listed escalation proposals recommended by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to the President. Number eight of these proposals states:
"cause interdicting rains in or near Laos."26 In a summary of the
eight proposals the memo reads:
The discussion section of the paper dealt with each
of the eight specific option areas noting our capability
in each instance to inflict heavy damage or^complete
destruction to the facilities in question.
From the above it become obvious that weather modification was deemed
an important weaponry in Vietnam.
After this information became known a number of congressmen became
interested and attempted to gain knowledge on the full details of the
operation. Senator Claiborne Pell in particular—as Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Oceans and International Environment—began a series
25The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of Decision-




of correspondence with the DOD on the matter. Inquiring about the
use of weather modification techniques in Indochina, Pell sought answers
to a number of questions including the following:
(1) What are the objectives of the project known by the code
name "Intermediary-Compatriot?
(2) How long has the project been in existence? Would you provide
a detailed description of this project?
28
(3) In what specific countries is this project conducted?
When the DOD did respond, they were quite evasive, either commenting
indirectly to Pell's letters (providing information on projects in
the Phillipines, Texas and elsewhere) or just completely disregarding
his inquiries. Pell's persistent efforts for four months finally got
him a clear cut answer from the Director of Defense Research and Engineering,
John S. Foster, Jr., who replied:
. . . Certain aspects of our work in this area (weather
modification) are classified. Recognizing that the
Congress is concerned with the questions of the military
application of weather modification technology, I have,
at the direction of Secretary Laird, seen to it that
the Chairman of the Committees of Congress with primary
responsibility for this Department's operations have
been completely informed regarding the details of all
classified weather modification undertaken by the Department.
However, since the information to which I refer has
a definite relationship to national security and is
classified as a result, I find it necessary and respectfully
and regretfully decline to make any further disclosure
of the details of these activities at this time.
Some months after this somewhat informative brush-off, Pell and a
number of other Senators submitted Senate Resolution 281 asking the
28
Congressional Record, Jan. 26, 1972, p. 1330.
29Ibid., p. 1330.
66
to seek an international agreement on this treaty in which:
Nations would undertake to prohibit and prevent any
environmental or geophysical modification activity
as weapons of war, or any research or experimentation
relating.to the development of these activities as
weapons.
At the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings in April 1972,
Senator Pell sought further information on weather modification through
31
direct questioning of former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird.
Laird first responded to Pell's questions just as the DOD had done
earlier by talking about weather projects in the Phillipines, Texas
and Caribbean. Pell then became direct and asked Laird, "Have we engaged
in these activities for military reasons in Southeast Asia?" Laird
replied, "I can't discuss the operating authority that we go forward
with in Southeast Asia." Later in the hearings, under questioning
from Senator J. William Fulbright, the questions dealt more directly
with weather modification activities in North Vietnam:
Fulbright: . . .why do you decline to discuss weather control
activities in North Vietnam when you freely discuss B-52 flights
over North Vietnam? What is the sensitive nature of weather control
or whatever you do with the weather?
Laird: I do not talk about things that we haven't done . . .
In connection with the weather programs. . .we have not conducted
. . .such programs, but I am not going to rule them out.
Fulbright: In other words, you have never engaged in the use
of weather control?
30
Congressional Record, March 17, 1972, p. 8872.
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For the transcript of this exchange, see Caplan, "Weather Modifi
cation," p. 29.
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Laird; We have never engaged in that type of activity over North
Vietnam.
Although Fulbright refused to question Laird about weather modification
activities in other areas of Southeast Asia, the implication was clear
that this type of operation had been used in areas other than North
Vietnam. But Peter Caplan points out that most meteorologists will
agree that it is not necessary to be "over" a country as small as North
33
Vietnam to modify its weather.
Except for Laird's denial concerning North Vietnam, the DOD's
refusal to comment on or deny the use of weather modification techniques
(claiming national security reasons) in the above mentioned hearings
and later ones on Senate Resolution 281, led a number of Congressmen
to conclude that the charges must be true. As one columnist reversed
the old saying: "The Generals are doing something about the weather,
but nobody is talking about it." Senator Pell in particular, on the
Senate floor on February 22, 1973 said outright, "In my own mind, there
is no doubt that the United States did indeed conduct weather modification
34
operations in Southeast Asia."
After these events there were two later developments which offered
further evidence that the U.S. had used weather modification activities
in Vietnam. One was the publication of a United Press International
32
Caplan, Ibid., p. 29 and Shapley, "Rainmaking," p. 1218.
33Caplan, Ibid., p. 29.
34
Congressional Record, March 8, 1973, p. S4129.
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report by an unofficial military newspaper Stars and Stripes. Commenting
on the military capabilities of some U.S. air bases and C-130 transport
planes located in Thailand, the report went:
The planes serve a variety of roles, from airborne
command post, to cloud seeding operations over North
Vietnam, to dropping-reconnaissance drones, to weather
reporting missions.
The second development arose on September 8, 1972 when
... a commercial weather modification firm, Weather
Engineering Corporation of Canada, Ltd., filed a suit
for $95 million in Washington claiming that the government
had used a cloud-seeding device called 'weather cord'
in Southeast Asia in violation of the firm's patent
rights.
In addition to these two events, a petition to President Nixon (March
1973) by the Federation of American Scientists appealing to him for
full disclosure of the previously classified information on weather
modification tended to substantiate others beliefs. The significance
of the petition, it should be pointed out, was the fact that its two
key representatives were Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr.,—(FAS Secretary;
former Deputy Director of the CIA under Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy,
and former Assistant Director for Science and Technology of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson)
and Dr. Donald J. F. MacDonald—(a member of the FAS Executive Committee,
a former charter member of the Presidents Council on Environmental
35
Deborah Shapley, "Weather Watch," Science (Vol. 178, No. 4057,
Oct. 13, 1972), p. 144.
36Shapley, Ibid., p. 145.
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Quality under President Nixon and formerly with the DOD's Institute
27
for Defense Analysis). Obviously these men and their colleagues
had some knowledge on the ability of United States to conduct geophysical
38
warfare. Ironcially, MacDonald, who is recognized as the nation's
leading authority on geophysical warfare, a year earlier (July 1972)
in testimony on Senate Resolution 281 sponsored by Senator Pell—had
refused to divulge any information on the United States weather modification
activities in South Asia on the grounds that it was classified information
From all available information we would suggest that the U.S.
military-under the code name "Intermediary-Compatriot"—conducted weather
modification activities in Indochina (South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia
and North Vietnam). As an integral part of a number of new counter-
insurgency weaponry, these activities served a multitude of purposes.
On the one hand it was to flood and muddy the hundreds of infiltration
routes which make up the Ho Chi Minh Trail. By damaging this trail
which winds through Laos, Cambodia, South Vietnam, North Vietnam and
China, it was hoped that the flow of men and material would be greatly
impeded. Moreover, The New York Times on July 1972 reported that the
weather modification activities were intended to supress enemy anti
missile fire, provide cover for South Vietnamese commandos penetrating
37
Congressional Record, March 8, 1973, p. S4129.
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See Gordon J. F. MacDonald, "How to Wreck the Environment,"
in Unless Peace Comes by Nigel Calder, (ed.) (New York: Viking Press,
1968). In this article MacDonald discusses the very concept of weather
modification.
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into North Vietnam. In addition, like ecological defoliation, these
weather activities would assist in the effort to force the masses of
people into the American created strategic hamlets.
As a counter-insurgency weapon weather modification was a rather
easy, cheap and covert operation. It is known that a cloud-seeding
plane can be of any type, needing little special equipment, and only
on
35 to 100 pounds of silver iodide for a normal seeding mission.
Using the "weathercord" device developed by the Weather Engineering
Corporation of Canada, the silver iodide would be distributed upon
release from the airplanes, after a brief 10-second delay.^° Interestingly,
the ability of the United States to increase rainfall was unquestionable.
For in one of the letters of correspondence with Senator Pell (dated
November 23, 1971) the DOD had explained its ability to carry out the
process:
. . .This research has established a significant point.
There is no known way to "make rain" under all conditions.
When the proper meteorological conditions prevail (that
is, when clouds capable of producing natural rain exist),
it is a relatively simple matter to increase the amount
of rain which will fall. The amount of increase is
frequently of the order of 30 to 5bT! (emphasis added)
This admission by the DOD is significant when its use is understood
as a related component of the heavy bombing raids in North Vietnam.
39Shapley, "Rainmaking," p. 1218.
Shapley, "Weather Watch," p. 145.
41
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In a study by John Gliedman, Terror From the Skies, the relationship
between bomb explosions (and the resultant invisible weakening of the
dike systems) and the additional rainfall cuased by weather modification
techniques are explained. Peter Caplan summaries Gliedman1s basic
contention:
He estimated the relatively modest additional volume
of water from rainfall at the end of the monsoon season
(when waters are highest and the soil saturated) that
would be needed to cause flooding, then compared that
to the volume claimed to be attainable by the latest
weather modification techniques. (See my (Slaughter)
footnote No. 19). He concluded that existing techniques
would have produced dangerous flooding, thus lending
some weight to Pell's accusations that the disasterous
1971 monsoon floods (among the five worst of,this country)
were attributable to rain-making activities.
If one connects Gliedman1s analysis with Anderson's assertion that
project "Intermediary-Compatriot" would take place from May to September
1972 (the monsoons are normally from April to October) it seems almost
indisputable that the United States was in part responsible for the
disastrous flooding.
In conclusion, then we can say that despite the lack of explicit
evidence, it is most probable that the United States has utilized weather
modification techniques as a form of warfare in Indochina. Moreover,
just as is the case with ecological defoliation, research presently
42
John Gliedman, Terror From the Sky: North Vietnam's Dikes and
the U.S. Bombing (Cambridge, Mass.: Vietnam Resource Center, 1972).
43
Caplan, "Weather Modification," p. 29. Pell charges appeared
in the New York Times on June 27, 1972.
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under a project code-named Nile Blue—continues to search for more
effective methods of weather modification. Geophysical warfare through
weather modification techniques has become another tactical weapon
as an integral part of the American military strategy of counter-insurgency.
As the final type of counter-insurgency weaponry tested and utilized
in Vietnam we would like to examine the development of technoligical
and electronic warfare. Taking shape during the last years of the
overt American manpower presence in the conflict, we noted earlier
that this form of warfare constituted an essential part of the Nixon
strategy of Vietnamization.
As a beginning, the first major attempt at automated warfare came
in 1967 when the United States attempted to build an electronic fence
across the 900 mile Demilitarized Zone. Mockingly known in military
circles as the "Maginot East Line" or "McNamara's Wall", the fence
was designed to stop infiltration from North to South Vietnam.
Later, due to monetary and manpower requirements needed to maintain
the fence, it was abandoned in 1969. After this project's failure
emphasis was placed on the development of counter-infiltration systems
which could be used throughout Vietnam. The code for this electronic
system was "Igloo White."
44
Congressional Record, March 17, 1972, p. 8871.
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Chris Robinson, "Electronic Battlefield, Inc.," Motive (Vol.
XXXI, No. 4 Feb. 1971) p. 34.
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See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Investi
gation into Electronic Battlefield Program, Hearings, before an Electronic
Battlefield Subcommittee, Senate, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, November
1970, pp. 106-128; and George Weiss, "The Air Forces Secret Electronic
War," Indochina Chronicle (No. 6 & &, Oct. 15, 1971) pp. 2-6.
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This system was composed of electronic sensors and detectors designed
to alert U.S. troops to the almost invisible movements of the guerrillas,
In brief, here is a limited example of some development: (a) acoustic
detectors—records the sounds produced by humans or vehicular activity
in a given area; (b) seismic detectors-register the pressure wave produced
in the earth's surface layer by a person walking or a vehicle in motion,
(c) magnetic detectors—indicate the presence of an unusual concentration
of ferromagnetic metals; (d) surveillance radars-designed to detect
moving targets, including soldiers or vehicles, in the vicinity of
a campside or border zone; and (e) night vision devices-designed to
illuminate trails and roads at night. In 1968, Leonard Sullivan, one
of the chief researchers for the DOD commented on these sensors:
These developments open up some very exciting horizons
as to what we can do five or ten years from now. When
one realizes that we can detect anything that perspires,
moves, carries metal, makes a noise, or is hotter or
colder than its surroundings, one begins to see the
potential. This is the beginning of the instrumentation
of the entire battlefield.
As Sullivan indicates, the final phase of the effort toward an
electronic battlefield was the decision to integrate these sensors
into computerized fire-control systems. This notion was first presented
to the public by Gen. Westmoreland in 1969. Speaking before the Association
of the U.S. Army he said:
47
See Michael Klare, War Without End: American Planning for the
Next Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1972) pp. 191-202; and Hearings,
Electronic Battlefield. Ibid., pp. 111-118.
Quoted in Klare, Ibid, p. 209.
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Comparing the past few years with a forecast of the
future produces one conclusion: we are on the threshold
of an entirely new battlefield concept. On the battlefield
of the future, enemy forces will be located, tracked
and targeted almost instaneously through the use of
data links, computer-assisted intelligency evaluation
and automatic fire control.
In addition, he explained further, "With first-round probability and
with surveillance devices that can continually track the enemy, the
need for large forces to fix the opposition physically will be less
important."
The actual implementation of the concept began around 1969. "The
Army began by setting up a program called Surveillance, Target Acquisition
and Night Observation (STANO) to plan, test and put into operation
a totally controlled and computerized electronic battlefield." According
to Gen. Betts of the army:
The STANO program was established to insure that all
battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance activities
are coordinated and that the end product of these activities
is an upgrading of our capacity to find the enemy and
to use our available fire-power to the maximum.
In addition to STANO, another testing project—Mobile Army Sensor
System Test, Evaluation and Review (MASSTER)—was also established.
Both STANO and MASSTER are the keystones to the major goal of an "Integrated
Battlefield Central System (IBCS)." The IBCS concept, as explained
by Mr. Klare:
49Klare, Ibid, p. 203.
Robinson, "Electronic Battlefield," p. 33.
Quoted in Klare, Ware Without End, p. 204.
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Calls for the integration of surveillance devices into
an automated weapons system that not only monitors
the sensor subsystem for signs of enemy activity but
also searches a computerized data bank for information
on the location of friendly and enemy forces in order
to determine the appropriate countermeasure.
A major aspect of the IBCS is the the communeiations system known
as the Automatic Data System for the Army in the field (ADSAF). It
is mainly a data processing system which coordinates intelligence,
53
logistics and personnel with fire control. Finally, under ADSAF
there are two other sub-systems. One is the Tactical Fire Direction
System (TACFIRE) and the other is Tactical Operations System (TOS).
TACFIRE consists of a central computer linking decentralized artillery
installations, while TOS translates and displays computer operations
for quick decision-making.
While the information present here is by no means a comprehensive
analysis of the electronic battlefield, it does present some of the
major developments in the area. From this one can clearly see that
the major thrust of Nixon's counter-insurgency strategy was the rapid
installation and use of almost purely technological warfare. Pushing
full speed ahead, Gen. Westmoreland said in 1969, "No more than ten
years should separate us from the automated battlefield."
In conclusion, we can say that the United States military was
led to develop a new concept of weaponry designed mainly for future
use in counter-insurgency warfare. For the most part, the new weaponry
attempts to respond to the ecological and tactical disadvantages of
52Klare, Ibid., pp. 205 and 206.
53
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a guerrilla war. In this context these weapons have sought to revolutionzie
the entire concept of weaponry and counter-insurgency strategy. Being
based primarily on capital-intensive technology, they hope to minimize
the need for a direct man-to-man confrontation with the guerrillas.
This is clearly the case with ecological defoliation and weather modification
where planes assume a major role. Also, with the automated battlefield,
the ultimate objective is no contact with U.S. personnel. Moreover,
in the past counter-insurgency strategies have argued that a manpower
ration of 10 to 1 is necessary to successfully win a guerrilla war.
All of the new weaponry discussed in this paper eventually seeks to
cut that ration drastically. The automated battlefield, in particular,
seeks to limit the U.S. ration to zero.
In sum, we can denote a number of control features about these
weapons. One, as mentioned is the sought after reduction in necessary
manpower. Two, all are based on highly scientific capital-intensive
technology. And, three, all would negate the necessity of a large
scale intervention by the U.S. military. These weapons, requiring
little manpower and training, could be handled by a small special forces
unit of the government which the United States would be assisting.
In light of the economic and political consequences of the intervention
in Vietnam, this point becomes significant. Overall, then, the United
States has attempted to develop and continues to refine, new weaponry
designed for the specific purpose of engaging in guerrilla wars. Based
on the particular make-up and purpose of these new concepts in war,




In summing up this work let me say that I have attempted to shed
some light on the American military doctrine of counter-insurgency.
Despite its overt military form, however, the essence of the concept
is its political significance. Counter-insurgency's purported objective
of challenging guerrilla warfare militarily was only its form, while
its political essence is to prevent the development of national libera
tion movements seeking social revolution. Accordingly the doctrine of
counter-insurgency had its genesis and development in what has come to
have greater significance than a mere military war, but what is now
referred to as the Vietnam era. It was an era in the sense that American
officials were attempting to stifle the emergence and progressive move
ment of a historical era. An era seeking the national and social libera
tion of oppressed peoples in those parts of the world which remain as
the antiquated historical legacies of eighteenth century European imperial
expansion and conquest. It was the attempt to shake off this decadent
legacy of not only formal European colonialism, but also the new yokes
of repression as manifested by reactionary elites, neocolonial lackeys
and lumpen-comprador bourgeoisie regimes. Hence, the post World War
II trend was one which had began to nuture a new era seeking the entire
social transformation of these societies. And it was in the context
of these opposing historical eras or trends that Vietnam emerged as
perhaps the most vivid expression of this clash of history.
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The United States government on the one hand represented the old
guard. As the top superpower of the international capitalist system
and ironically not one of the former colonial empires, it stood as
imperialism last bastion of defense. As the European empires crumbled,
no longer capable of maintaining their overt imperialist presence,
the United States stepped in to stifle, crush and annihilate what seemed
to be a classic case of social revolution—the Vietnamese revolution.
Classic in the sense that the Vietnamese nation had historically risen
to the occasion to resist foreign domination and oppression in every
form. Moreover, the Vietnamese people had waged a militant nationalist
and people's guerrilla war to wrench themselves free from the French
colonial empire thereby dealing a serious blow to the international
imperialist system. Yet the critical feature of this revolution was
not simply its nationalistic spirit and guerrilla warfare nature, but
more important the dialectical evolution of these features with a social
ideology which would move Vietnam into an unseen historical era of
development for its people. The era of course being the socialist
path of development, the antithesis of international capitalism and
imperialism.
The transformation of the Vietnamese revolution from a nationalist
one into a socialist one thus changed the entire character of the struggle.
For this meant the extraction of the Vietnamese people from the throes
of the western capitalist system. This particular process in time would
mean the destruction of traditional economic trappings which the indus
trialized nations of the West had imposed on the so-called developing
countries of the Third World. By taking this militant path of socialist
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transformation the Vietnamese people would inevitably break the vicious
cycle of stagnation and regression which other poor nations pursuing
western-oriented paths of modernization had been subjected. Thus, the
western model of development which has become more clearly exposed as
a process leading to what analysts in the field speak of as the "develop
ment of underdevelopment," would be totally rejected by the Vietnamese
people.
This rejection coupled with a successful socialist alternative,
could have possibly become a model for other underdeveloping nations.
Thus, we have the political essence of the American intervention, namely
the prevention of world-wide socialist revolution. Militarily, however,
the form of the American involvement was its counter-insurgency character.
In this sense American officials were seeking a military strategy capable
of defeating the means by which revolutionaries would possibly seek to
gain political power. Their overriding concern being focused on the
strategy of guerrilla or people's war taking into consideration its
military tactics and its implicit ideological and political ramifications.
Hence in the course of the Vietnam war, American officials developed
a comprehensive political and military strategy of counter-insurgency
along with the accompanying technological innovations necessary to imple
ment the policy. The purpose of which was to challenge guerrilla warfare
and prevent the proliferation of national liberation movements espousing
nations of radical social transformation.
Importantly, while in a relative sense the strategy of counter-
insurgency as devised and developed in Vietnam was an absolute failure,
the consequences for other nations attempting similar revolutionary
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movements may not be as sure. On the one hand, the years of experience
of the Vietnamese guerrillas was invaluable as they were able to con
stantly devise and create counter strategies and techniques in confronting
the American military machine. Other movements lacking this experience
in addition to the Vietnamese's remarkable program of organization,
recruitment and motivation may not be able to withstand the rigorous
and vicious attack of a massive counter-insurgency effort. Fortunately
in view of the thorough and devasting defeat of the United States in
Vietnam, other countries may be spared an overt American intervention.
Yet the counter-insurgency strategies, tactics and techniques developed
in Vietnam have been transferred to reactionary client regimes throughout
the world with the specific intention of negating the very development
of revolutionary movements. The main form of this American counter-
insurgency assistance has been through a variety of aid programs including
civic action, military training and work with local police forces.
Thus, we cannot underestimate the significance of counter-insurgency
as a world-wide counter-revolutionary phenomenon. Yet, its existence
must not become a reason to be cautious or fearful of revolutionary
actions, for Vietnam stands as a shining testament to the victory of
people's war. What it must do is force national liberation movements
throughout the world to become more skillful in their political actions,
be prepared to make serious and necessary sacrifices and resolute in
their decision to bring about revolutionary change. With that in mind
we can rest assured that as the late great revolutionary Chou En-lai
once remarked, "... that whatever the zigzags or reverses there will
be in the development of history, the general trend of the world is
definitely toward light and not darkness."
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